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Abstract 
A system of independent components is defended by a strategic defender and attacked by a 
strategic attacker. The reliability of each component depends on how strongly it is defended and 
attacked, and on the intensity of the contest. In a series system the attacker benefits from a 
substitution effect since attacker benefits flow from attacking any of the components, while the 
defender needs to defend all components. Even for a series system, when the attacker is 
sufficiently disadvantaged with high attack inefficiencies, and the intensity of the contest is 
sufficiently high, the defender earns maximum utility and the attacker earns zero utility. The 
results for the defender (attacker) in a parallel system are equivalent to the results for the attacker 
(defender) in a series system. Hence the defender benefits from the substitution effect in parallel 
systems. With budget constraints the ratio of the investments for each component, and the 
contest success function for each component, are the same as without budget constraints when 
replacing the system values for the defender and attacker with their respective budget 
constraints. For a series system of parallel subsystems, inifinitely many components in parallel 
benefits the defender maximally regardless of the finite number of parallel subsystems in series. 
Ceteris paribus, and with equivalence requirements, the defender prefers the series system of 
parallel subsystems rather than the parallel system of series subsystems, and conversely for the 
attacker. 
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1 Introduction 
This is the first article in a sequence of two that analyzes strategic defense and attack for series 
and parallel reliability systems. This article considers simultaneous moves by the defender and 
attacker. The second article considers sequential moves by the defender and attacker. 
 
A large literature on security and safety applies reliability analysis to determine the most cost-
effective risk reduction strategies. Examples are Levitin (2002, 2003a, 2003b), Levitin and 
Lisnianski (2000, 2001, 2003), and Levitin et al. (2003). The external threat is usually assumed 
to be static. Within cyber security Gordon and Loeb (2002) and Gordon et al. (2003) determine 
the optimal investment for information protection, and Gal-Or and Ghose (2005) analyze how 
market characteristics affect security investment. Again the threat is assumed fixed and 
immutable. 
 
Some research applying game theory considers components in isolation (Major 2002; Woo, 
2002, 2003; O’Hanlon et al, 2002). For multiple components one strand of literature associates 
one defender with each component. Hausken (2002) lets each agent dichotomously choose a 
strategy which for its component causes either reliability zero with no cost of effort or reliability 
one for a fixed cost of effort. He finds that the series, parallel, and summation systems frequently 
correspond to the coordination game, the battle of the sexes and the chicken game, and prisoner's 
dilemma, respectively.  
 
Kunreuther and Heal (2003) analyze interdependent systems where one target’s defense benefits 
all targets.1 Bier and Gupta (2006) explore the effects of heterogeneous discount rates on the 
optimal defensive strategy in such systems. Hausken (2006) finds that with increasing 
interdependence, each defending agent free rides by investing less, suffers lower profit, while 
the attacker enjoys higher profit. Enders and Sandler (2003) and Hausken (2006) analyze the 
substitution effect which causes a strategic attacker to substitute into the most optimal attack 
allocation across multiple targets, and the income effect which eliminates parts of the attacker’s 
resource base. 
 
                                                 
1 Examples occur within the airline industry, computer networks, fire protection, theft protection, bankruptcy 
protection, vaccinations. 
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Another strand of literature lets one defender defend entire systems. For series and parallel 
systems with independent components Bier and Abhichandani (2002) and Bier et al. (2005) 
assume that the defender minimizes the success probability, and expected damage, respectively, 
of an attack. The success probability depends on the resources expended by the defender to 
strengthen each component.2 Although the approach implicitly accounts for a strategic attacker 
(for series systems the defender equalizes the expected damage of attacks against multiple 
components), a more general approach would assume that the success probability of an attack 
depends on resource investments by both the defender and the attacker for each component. The 
attack September 11, 2001 illustrated that major threats today involve strategic attackers. Threats 
emerge from nature, technology, and humans, but increasing complexity and human 
involvement suggest that the strategic factor needs to be given increased emphasis in future 
research. 
 
Azaiez and Bier (2006) discuss various simplifications to this general approach. For example, 
the level of effort expended by the attacker on each component could be a constant. They choose 
the simplification that the success probability of an attack on each component is constant, and 
assume that the defender attempts to deter attacks by making them as costly as possible to the 
attacker. This enables them to find closed-form results for systems with moderately general 
structures with both parallel and series subsystems. 
 
The objective of this article is to extend the research where an entire system of independent 
components is defended by a fully strategic defender and attacked by a fully strategic attacker. 
The external threat is neither static, fixed, nor immutable. Series and parallel systems are 
considered, as well as series systems of parallel subsystems, and parallel systems of series 
subsystems. The defender and attacker adapt to each other optimally choosing continuous 
strategic variables for each component under defense and attack. The reliability of each 
component depends on the relative investments the defender and attacker direct into defending 
versus attacking that component. The defender seeks to maximize the reliability of the system, 
accounting for its assessment of the value of the system, while the attacker seeks to minimize the 
                                                 
2 Further results are by Bier et al. (2005: 322) who show that “if one component is more valuable than another, but 
has a lower probability of being attacked, then the more vulnerable but less valuable component may be more likely 
to be attacked, and hence merit greater investment.” Also, Bier et al. (2006) analyze the optimal allocation of 
defensive resources in the face of uncertainty about attacker goals, motivations, and valuations of potential targets. 
 5
reliability, accounting for its often different assessment of the system value. One paramount 
consideration is how each agent substitutes investments across multiple components. 
 
One defense inefficiency and one attack inefficiency are associated with each component, which 
specify unit costs of defense and attack. Such inefficiencies vary considerably across 
components. A component such as the US Gold Reserve stored at Ft. Knox has high defense 
inefficiency and even higher attack inefficiency. It is located for optimal defense, and is very 
hard to attack. Another component such as the U.S. Statue of Liberty has a more vulnerable 
location which increases the defense inefficiency and decreases the attack inefficiency. A 
component such as an underground transport system has high defense inefficiency since it is 
geographically dispersed, and low attack inefficiency. In contrast, a component buried deep 
within a mountain has low defense inefficiency and high attack inefficiency. 
 
The article assumes variation in the intensity of the contest between the defender and attacker 
for each component. The intensity can vary greatly across components. Low intensity occurs for 
components and systems that are defendable, and where the individual components are 
dispersed. In such cases neither the defender nor the attacker can easily get a significant upper 
hand. High intensity occurs for systems that are easier to attack, and where the individual 
components are concentrated. This may cause “winner-take-all” battles and dictatorship by the 
strongest agent. 
 
A crucial issue for defense and attack is how the various components, such as in these examples, 
are interlinked in series and parallel. As is conventional in the literature, components are 
assumed independent. If they are not, the analysis presumes application of Simon’s (1969:217) 
principle of “near decomposability”. Complex or hierarchic systems are frequently nearly 
decomposable, and intracomponent linkages are generally stronger than intercomponent 
linkages. Multiple subcomponents that are sufficiently interdependent are joined together to 
form one larger aggregate component which thus has a more complex internal structure from 
which the relevant parameters such as the unit costs of defense and attack, and the intensity of 
the contest, are determined. This process continues until each component is sufficiently 
independent from the other components so that the analysis can justifiably assume independent 
components as an approximation. 
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Section 2 introduces component and system reliabilities, utilities, and contest success functions. 
Sections 3 and 4 analyze the series system without and with budget constraints. Sections 5 and 6 
analyze the parallel system without and with budget constraints. Section 7 considers the series 
system of parallel subsystems, and section 8 considers the parallel system of series subsystems. 
Section 9 concludes. 
 
2 Component and system reliabilities, utilities, and contest success functions 
A system of components configured in some manner is under attack. A defender of the system 
invests in security technology and safety measures to ensure that the system is secure and safe, 
which is needed for it to function reliably. The defender incurs an effort it , hereafter referred to 
as an investment, at unit cost ic  to defend component i. Higher ic  means greater inefficiency of 
investment, and 1/ ic  is the efficiency. The security and safety investment expenditure is 
if , 
i=1,…,n, which can be capital and/or labor, where /i if t∂ ∂ >0. We consider the simple case 
if = i ic t . If the system is a cyber security system, the defender hires security experts, installs 
firewalls, applies encryption techniques, access control mechanisms, develops intrusion 
detection systems, and designs the optimal defense for the system. If the system consists of 
serially linked components in a societal infrastructure, for example production of goods and 
services such as water and food, communication, transport, finance, governmental functions, and 
health services, the investments consist in safeguarding the components with human inspection 
and patrolling, development of procedures, technology investments, surveillance of potential 
sources of threats, elimination of threats, and deterrence.  
 
Conversely, the attacker seeks to attack the system to ensure that it does not function reliably. 
Analogously, it incurs an efforts iT  at unit cost iC  to attack component i. iC  is the inefficiency 
of investment, and 1/ iC  is the efficiency. Its investment expenditure is 
iF , capital and/or labor, 
i=1,…,n, where /i iF T∂ ∂ >0. We assume iF = i iC T . If the system is a cyber security system, the 
attacker seeks to break through the security defense, circumvent the work of the security experts, 
penetrate the firewalls, decipher the encryption, and bypass the access control mechanisms and 
intrusion detection systems. A successful attack reduces the reliability of the system through 
appropriating, getting access to, or confiscating, something of value within or related to the 
system, or securing information which can be used as means of reducing system reliability. If 
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the system is a part of the societal infrastructure, the attacker seeks to reduce the reliability 
through destruction, distortion, theft, and interfering with production, human inspection and 
patrolling, avoidance of surveillance, covert action to avoid detection, manipulation of 
information, and public revelation of system weaknesses. Both the defender and the attacker are 
assumed to be risk neutral.3 
 
We formulate the reliability pi of component i, i=1,…,n, as a contest success function pi between 
the defender and attacker. The reliability in our context corresponds to the asset in the conflict 
literature (Hausken 2005). There is conflict over reliability between the defender and the 
attacker, just as there is conflict over an asset between contending agents. The defender enjoys 
contest success pi, while the attacker enjoys contest success 1-pi. Skaperdas (1996) has presented 
three axioms for contest success functions between two agents. First, 0≤ pi≤1, and the contest 
success for the defender and attacker sum to one. Second, /i ip t∂ ∂ >0 and /i ip T∂ ∂  which means 
that the reliability increases in the defender’s investment, and decreases in the attacker’s 
investment. Third, each agent’s contest success depends on its investment, ti or Ti, and not on the 
identity of the agent or opponent (anonymity property).  
 
The reliability pi can be given two interpretations. The first is that component i is 100% reliable 
with probability pi, and 100% unreliable with probability 1- pi. This means 100% functionality 
or 100% incapacitation. The second is that component i functions deterministically to a fixed 
degree pi. That is, with 100% certainty damage is caused to component i, but the component 
functions with guaranteed reliability pi nevertheless. For the second interpretation consider a 
defensive force and an offensive force fighting to keep a road open versus blocked. Neither side 
is 100% successful. Assume that pi=0.65 so that the defense has 65% success keeping the road 
open while the attack has 35% success keeping the road blocked. This means that 65% of all 
traffic passes through the road. 
The reliability p of a system is determined from the reliabilities pi of the individual components 
dependent on how these are configured in series and parallel. The two interpretations of 
reliability also apply for the system as a whole. The defender and attacker are concerned about 
the damage to the system. The defender seeks to minimize the damage, while the attacker seeks 
                                                 
3 An alternative analysis may assume that the defender is risk averse and the attacker risk seeking. Assuming risk 
neutrality simplifies the analysis. Much of the economic conflict literature related to production, appropriation, 
defense, and rent seeking assumes risk neutrality. See Skaperdas (1991) for an exception.  
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to maximize it. We express the linkage from reliability to damage for the defender as 
d(t,T)=r(1-p), where r is the damage as perceived by the defender if the system is 100% 
disabled. We also refer to r as the value of the system for the defender when it is not under 
attack, and rp as the system value when it is under attack. The defender’s utility is 
1
n
i i
i
u rp c t
=
= −∑  (1) 
which the defender seeks to maximize, and which can be measured e.g. in dollar, and where the 
expenditures of defending the n components are subtracted. The defender seeks to increase the 
system reliability, but not at any expenditure. When the expenditures exceed the benefit, the 
defender chooses zero effort ti=0 for all components, and earns zero utility. The defender and 
attacker have subjective utilities and often assess damage differently. We express the linkage 
from reliability to damage for the attacker as D(t,T)=R(1-p), where R is the damage as perceived 
by the attacker if the system is 100% disabled. We also refer to R as the value of the system for 
the attacker. The attacker’s utility is 
( )
1
1
n
i i
i
U R p C T
=
= − −∑  (2) 
which the attacker seeks to maximize, and where the expenditures of attacking the n components 
are subtracted. Analogously, the attacker seeks to decrease the system reliability, but not at any 
expenditure. 
 
The most common functional form for the contest success function is the ratio form 
mi
i
i m mi i
i i
t
p
t T
= +  (3) 
where mi≥0 is a parameter for component i. The second most common form is the difference or 
logit form 
( )
( ) ( )
i i
i
i i i i
Exp a t
p
Exp a t Exp a T
= +  (4) 
where ai≥ 0 is a mass effect parameter for component i. Both these two forms satisfy the three 
axioms above. Choosing between these functional forms is analogous to choosing e.g. between 
Cobb-Douglas and CES production and utility functions in economics. The results are usually 
qualitatively similar, but there can be differences e.g. for investments close to zero or infinity. 
Determining the appropriate functional form is an important empirical issue, as is also 
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determining the appropriate values of mi and ai, the unit costs of investments, and the values 
the defender and attacker assess for the value of the system. Hybrids of (3) and (4) can also be 
considered, and different mi’s and a’s for the defender and attacker.  
 
Fig. 1 illustrates for the ratio form how, for Ti held fixed at Ti=1 for the attacker, the reliability pi 
responds to changes in the investment ti for the defender. At the limit, with infinitely much 
defensive investment, and finite offensive investment, component i is 100% reliable. The same 
result follows with finite defensive investment and zero offensive investment. At the other limit, 
with infinitely much offensive investment, and finite defensive investment, component i is 0% 
reliable. The same result follows with finite offensive investment and zero defensive investment. 
The sensitivity of pi to ti increases as mi increases. When mi=0, the investments ti and Ti have 
equal impact on the reliability regardless of their size which gives 50% reliability, pi=1/2.4 0< 
mi<1 gives a disproportional advantage of investing less than one’s opponent. When mi=1, the 
investments have proportional impact on the reliability. mi>1 gives a disproportional advantage 
of investment more effort than one’s opponent. This is often realistic in praxis, as evidenced by 
benefits from economies of scale. Finally, mi=∞  gives a step function where “winner-takes-all”. 
That is, the defender earns zero reliability when ti is marginally smaller than Ti, and earns 
maximum reliability when ti is marginally larger than Ti. This illustrates that the contest 
intensifies as m increases. 
 
The parameter mi is a characteristic of the contest over component i. It can be illustrated by the 
history of warfare. Low intensity occurs for components that are defendable, predictable, and 
where the individual ingredients of each components are dispersed, i.e. physically distant or 
separated by barriers of various kinds. Neither the defender nor the attacker can get a significant 
upper hand. An example is the time prior to the emergence of cannons and modern fortifications 
in the fifteenth century. Another example is entrenchment combined with the machine gun, in 
multiply dispersed locations, in World War I (Hirshleifer 1995:32-33). High mi occurs for 
components that are less predictable, easier to attack, and where the individual ingredients of 
each component are concentrated, i.e. close to each other or not separated by particular barriers. 
This may cause “winner-take-all” battles and dictatorship by the strongest. Either the defender or 
                                                 
4 In the conflict literature this is referred to as egalitarian distribution of an asset independent of effort, so that 
each agent receives 50%. In our context mi=0 gives “egalitarianism” between the defender and the attacker in 
the sense that the defender obtains half as much reliability as it maximally hopes for for component i. We ignore 
mi<0 which corresponds in one sense to altruism and in another sense to punishing individual investments and 
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the attacker may get the upper hand. The combination of airplanes, tanks, and mechanized 
infantry in World War II allowed both the offense and defense to concentrate firepower more 
rapidly, which intensified the effect of force superiority.5 
 
Fig. 2 illustrates for the difference form how, for Ti held fixed at Ti=1 for the attacker, the 
reliability pi responds to changes in the investment ti for the defender. The curves have large 
similarities with Fig. 1. A main difference is that the reliability is strictly positive pi>0 also when 
the defender invests zero, it =0. If the defender invests zero, it is not always realistic that the 
defender suffers zero reliability when the attacker invests a finite, and possibly arbitrarily small, 
amount. This is possible for components that are technologically designed in a hardened 
manner, or when the attacker is less than fully alert and determined. Hirshleifer (1989:104) 
argues that “in a military context we might expect the ratio form of the Contest Success 
Function to be applicable when clashes take place under close to ‘idealized’ conditions such as: 
an undifferentiated battlefield, full information, and unflagging weapons effectiveness. In 
contrast, the difference form tends to apply where there are sanctuaries and refuges, where 
information is imperfect, and where the victorious player is subject to fatigue and distraction.” 
Hence, applying the difference form, in struggles between nations, one side may surrender rather 
than resist against an unappeasable opponent, with the expectation of not losing everything, 
realizing the cost to the victor of locating and extracting all the spoils. 
 
3 Series system 
The reliability of a series system is a benefit to the defender and equals the product of the 
component reliabilities pi, i=1,…,n. This benefit expresses the value of system functionality, 
scaled between zero and one. The benefit is scaled relative to the expenditures, by adjusting the 
ci’s. Inserting into (1), and applying the contest success function in (3), we model the defender’s 
utility as6 
                                                                                                                                                        
placing a premium on laziness. 
5 We could assume different mi’s for the offense and defense, e.g. high mi for the offense if enabled to concentrate 
firepower and low mi for the defense if not enabled to concentrate firepower. But, this has not been common in the 
conflict literature, and makes the analysis intractable. Furthermore, different unit costs ci and Ci of effort for the 
defender and offender gives all the differentiating characteristics we need since one contestant less enabled to 
concentrate firepower can be modeled as incurring a higher unit cost of generating firepower. 
6 Equation (5) corresponds to Bier et al.’s (2005) analysis in that they also consider the value of system functionality, 
but differs in that they also consider the value of each component, i.e. the loss if one component is disabled 
irrespective of whether the system is disabled. 
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11
mn ni
i
i im mi i
ii i i
t
u r c t
t T ==
= −+ ∑∏  (5) 
In contrast, the attacker seeks to decrease the system reliability. Since 
1
0 1n ii p=≤ ≤∏ , we 
formulate this such that the attacker seeks to increase 
1
1 n ii p=−∏ . Inserting into (2), the 
attacker’s utility is 
11
1
mn ni
i
i im mi i
ii i i
t
U R C T
t T ==
 = − − +  ∑∏  (6) 
The defender has n free choice variables ti. The attacker has n free choice variables Ti. Applying 
the ratio form in (3), the 2n FOCs are 
1 1
2 2
1 1
0, 0
( ) ( )
m mj jm m m mn ni i i i
j ji i i i i i
i im m m m m m m mi i j j i i j j
j ji ii i i ij j j jj i j i
t tm t T m T tu Ur c R C
t Tt T t Tt T t T
− −
= =≠ ≠
∂ ∂= − = = − =∂ ∂+ ++ +∏ ∏  (7) 
The FOCs give it = /i i iT rC Rc . In the case ci/r=Ci/R zero investment Ti=ti=0 is not possible since 
one agent investing arbitrarily little earns a jump from 50% to 100% of the reliability r. 
Applying the difference form in (4), the 2n FOCs are 
2
1
2
1
( )[ ( )]
0,
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
( )[ ( )]
0
( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
1 1
n
j ji i i i
i
ji i i i i j j j j
j i
n
j ji i i i
i
ji i i i i j j j j
j i
i
i i
Exp a ta Exp a t Tu r c
t Exp a t Exp a T Exp a t Exp a T
Exp a ta Exp a t TU R C
T Exp a t Exp a T Exp a t Exp a T
u Uc C
r t R T
=≠
=≠
+∂ = − =∂ + +
+∂ = − =∂ + +
 ∂ ∂⇒ + = + ∂ ∂ 
∏
∏
i
   
 (8) 
A special case of (8) has been analyzed by Hirshleifer (1989). In the case ci/r=Ci/R, zero 
investment Ti=ti=0 is possible since one agent investing arbitrarily little does not earn a jump 
from 50% to 100% of the reliability r. As an example, assume Ti=0. Inserting into (8) implies 
that ti=0 is a solution when /ic r =
1/ 2nia
+ . When ci/r≠ Ci/R, there is no interior solution to (8). 
As Hirshleifer (1989:107) points out, the reason is that for the difference form the marginal cost 
of contest effort is constant. The implication for our purpose is that the defender enjoys 100% 
reliability for component i when ci/r>Ci/R, that the attacker enjoys 0% reliability for component 
i when ci/r<Ci/R, and that they both earn 50% reliability when ci/r=Ci/R. In this latter case (8) 
gives one equation with two unknown ti and Ti. The characteristics of (8) are such that the ratio 
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form which allows for general and often realistic interior solutions is more interesting to 
analyze, and is the main focus in this article. 
 
Proposition 1. The ratio of investments for each component is inverse proportional to the ratio 
of the unit costs to the system value, /i it T = ( / ) /( / )i iC R c r , unrelated to that of the other 
components. The investment expenditures relative to the system value for the defender and the 
attacker are equal for each component, that is /i it c r = /i iT C R , regardless of the parameter mi. 
 
Proposition 1 follows since components are assumed independent. It states that neither the 
defender nor the attacker has an incentive to increase or decrease his/her investment expenditure 
relative to the system value above or below that of the opponent. An increase for the defender 
would increase the reliability, but the additional cost is not worth it. Conversely, a decrease for 
the defender would decrease the reliability below the optimum, and incurring additional cost 
would be appropriate. Deviation from equality is equally suboptimal for the attacker. For a given 
ratio of attack expenditure to system value, /i iT C R , increasing (decreasing) the defense 
inefficiency ic  for component i causes the defender to decrease (increase) its investment it  such 
that /i it c r = /i iT C R  is preserved. The logic is analogous for the attacker. 
 
Solving (7) gives 
1
2
1
1
2
1
( / )( / ) ( / ) /
,
/(( / ) ( / ) ) ( / ) ( / )
( / )( / ) ( / ) /
,
/ /(( / ) ( / ) ) ( / ) ( / )
m jm m ni i
ji i i i i
i m m m mi i j j
j i ii i j jj i
m jm m ni i
ji i i i i
i m m m mi i j j
j i i i ii i j jj i
C Rm c r C R t C R
t
T c rc r C R c r C R
C Rm C R c r t C R
T
t T C R c rc r C R c r C R
−
=≠
−
=≠
= =+ +
= =+ ++ +
∏
∏
 (9) 
 
Proposition 2. (a) The investments decrease in n. (b) Assume mi=mj=1. For the defender, 
/ ( / )i it c r∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i jt c r∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i it C R∂ ∂ <0 when /ic r < /iC R , / ( / )i jt C R∂ ∂ >0. For 
the attacker, / ( / )i iT C R∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i jT C R∂ ∂ >0, / ( / )i iT c r∂ ∂ >0 when /iC R > /ic r , 
/ ( / )i jT c r∂ ∂ <0, i,j=1,…,n, i≠ j. 
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Proof. (a) Since ( / ) /(( / ) ( / ) )m m mj j jj j jC R c r C R+ <1 in (9), adding an additional component 
causes multiplication with yet another ratio less than one, which causes lower ti and lower Ti. (b) 
See Appendix 1. 
 
Both agents invest less when the number of components increases. It is more difficult for the 
defender to defend many components in a series system. And, the attacker benefits without 
having to invest much. When mi=mj=1, the defender invests less to defend component i when 
any defense inefficiency increases. Conversely, it invests more in component i when the attack 
inefficiency of component i increases given that /ic r > /iC R , and it invests more in component 
i when the attack inefficiency of any component j increases. Higher defense inefficiency for any 
component has impact throughout causing lower investment. In contrast, higher attack 
inefficiency for a given component causes higher defense investment for all other components, 
and for the given component if high ratio of unit cost to system value /ic r . 
 
Analogously, the attacker invests less to attack component i when the attack inefficiency of 
component i increases. However, in contrast to the defender, the attacker invests more to attack 
component i when the attack inefficiency of component j increases. The substitution effect 
applies strongly for the attacker, but less so for the defender. When the attacker suffers attack 
inefficiency for component j, it substitutes to attacking component i. The reason is that the 
attacker benefits from attacking any of the components in a series system, and choosing the most 
cost effective attack is beneficial. The defender needs to defend all components for the series 
system to function. It cannot substitute strongly from component j to component i when the 
inefficiency of component j increases (since / ( / )i jt c r∂ ∂ <0) since that would make component 
j vulnerable for a strong attack due to substitution by the attacker. Mathematically, observe in (9) 
that /jc r  is not present in the numerator of it , while /jC R  is indeed present in the numerator 
of iT . 
 
However, when choosing it  and assuming mi=mj=1, the defender is more negatively influenced 
by a high /ic r  than by a high /jc r . This can be interpreted as a moderate substitution effect 
also for the defense. This can be seen from the four denominators in (9) which have one square 
bracket and one bracket that is not squared. For component i the investments it  and iT  have 
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squared brackets in the denominators for the inefficiencies /ic r  and /iC R , which causes 
reduced investment if these inefficiencies are large. We formulate this as a follows. 
 
Proposition 3. In a series system the attacker benefits more from the substitution effect than the 
defender since attacker benefits flow from attacking any of the components, while defender 
benefits flow from defending all components. The attacker is highly sensitive to the difference in 
the attack efficiencies for the components. The defender is less sensitive to the difference in the 
defense efficiencies for the components. 
 
Proposition 2 also states that when mi=mj=1, the defender increases the investment it  when 
/jC R  increases ( / ( / )i jt C R∂ ∂ >0). This is a natural consequence of the attacker’s substitution 
effect. When the attack inefficiency /jC R  increases, the attacker substitutes to attacking 
component i, causing the defender to increase it  to defend component i. Conversely, the 
attacker decreases the investment iT  when jc  increases ( / ( / )i jT c r∂ ∂ <0). The reason is that 
increasing /jc r  causes reduced investment also of it  for the defender. To preserve 
/i it c r = /i iT C R  in Proposition 1, iT  decreases too. 
 
To further illustrate the substitution effect, (9) implies 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
,
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
m m m mm mj j j ji i
i i j j i i j j ji i
m mm m m mj ji i i i
j jj j i i j j i i i
m c r c r C R m c r C R c r C Rt T
t Tm c r c r C R m c r C R c r C R
−
−
+ +
= =+ + (10) 
for any two components i,j=1,…,n, i≠ j. Both agents’ investment ratios increases in /i jm m , so 
larger intensity causes larger investment for any given component. When mi=mj=1, the ratio 
/i jt t  of the defender’s investments simply increases in the sum of the inefficiencies of 
component j, and decreases in the sum of the inefficiencies of component i. The defender is 
investment sensitive in a straightforward manner. However, when mi=mj=1, the attacker’s 
investment ratio /i jT T  is impacted by two additional ratios. First, /i jc c  partly counterbalances 
the ratio of the sums of the inefficiencies, tilting the balance toward attacking component i if the 
defense inefficiency of component i is large. Secondly, and more importantly, /j iC C  
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demonstrates the substitution effect. Component i is attacked more fiercely if the attack 
inefficiency of component j is large. 
 
Inserting (9) into (5) and (6) gives the utilities 
1 1
1 1
( / ) ( / )
1 ,
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
( / ) ( / )
1 1
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
m mnn i i
i i i
m m m mi i i i
i ii i i i
m mnn i i
i i i
m m m mi i i i
i ii i i i
m c r C R
u r
c r C R c r C R
m c r C R
U R
c r C R c r C R
= =
= =
 = − + + 
  = − +   + +  
∑ ∏
∑ ∏
 (11) 
which depend on the ratio ( / ) /( / )i ic r C R , and not on the absolute values of ci/r and Ci/R, When 
(11) gives negative utilities, a corner solution emerges with zero utility and zero investment for 
that agent (either the defender or the attacker) which according to (11) would otherwise get 
negative utility. Using (5) or (6), the other agent gets a utility equal to the value of the system by 
investing arbitrarily small but positive amounts into defending or attacking the components. The 
product 
1
( )
n
i=
⋅∏  causes high utility to the defender of high attack inefficiencies. Subtraction of 
this product causes low utility to the attacker. Let us consider three benchmarks. First, inserting 
mi=0 for the “egalitarian” contest into (9) and (11) gives 
10, , 1
2 2i i n n
rt T u U R  = = = = −    (12) 
Egality has four implications. First, the agents incur zero investments since utilities are 
independent of investments. Second, for each component viewed in isolation the reliability is 
50% which benefits the defender and attacker equally much when R=r. When R=r they meet 
half way between their preferred utility of the system value and the non-preferred utility zero. 
Third, the defender’s utility equals ½ raised to the number of components for the series system, 
multiplied with r, which decreases convexly in n. Fourth, there is no waste in the sense that the 
two utilities sum to r when R=r, so the attacker receives r minus the utility of the defender, 
which increases concavely in n. For all positive values of m investments are positive which 
causes the sum of the utilities to the defender and attacker to be less than r when R=r. Second, 
inserting Ci/R=ci/r into (9) and (11) gives 
1
1 1
1 1, 1 , 1 1
2 22 / 2 2
n n
i i i
i i n n n
i ii
m m m
t T u r U R
c r+ = =
    = = = − = − +        ∑ ∑  (13) 
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Although the agents have equal unit costs of investment, the defender is strongly 
disadvantaged by both high mi and high n. The defender’s utility reaches zero when 
1 2
n
i
i
m
=
∑ ≥1, 
which makes the n components 100% insecure. The attacker also suffers from high mi, but 
benefits from high n as shown in (A2). The sum of the utilities for the agents is 
1
1
11
22
n
i
n
i
m
r −
=
 −  ∑  when R=r, which is less than r because of the wastage of investment. This 
sum decreases in mi, but increases in n since the attacker benefits more than the defender suffers 
as the number of components increases. As our third benchmark, inserting ci=c, Ci=C, mi=m 
into (9) and (11) gives 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ), ,
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
( / ) /( / ) 11 ,
( / ) /( / ) 1 ( / ) /( / ) 1
( / ) /( / ) 11 1
( / ) /( / ) 1 ( / ) /( / ) 1
m mn m mn
i in nm m m m
m
n
m
n
m c r C R m c r C Rt T
c r C R c r C R
mn c r C R
u r
c r C R c r C R
mn c r C R
U R
c r C R c r C R
− −
+ += =+ +
  = − + + 
    = − +  + +  
 (14) 
Proposition 4. (a) When Ci/R=ci/r, both agents’ utilities decrease linearly in mi. (b) When the 
defender is advantaged with a sufficiently small ( / ) /( / )i ic r C R  for all i, u increases in mi=m. 
(c) When the attacker is advantaged with a sufficiently large ( / ) /( / )i ic r C R  for all i, U 
increases in mi=m. (d) The defender’s utility decreases in n. (e) The attacker’s utility increases 
in n. (f) When mi=m,n,ci/r,Ci/R in (11) are such that u<0 and U>0, which implies u=0 and 
U=R, the series system is 100% insecure. When m,n,ci/r,Ci/R in (11) are such that u>0 and 
U<0, which implies u=r and U=0, the series system is 100% secure. 
 
Proof. (a) Differentiating (13) gives / iu m∂ ∂ = 1/ 2nr +− , / iU m∂ ∂ = 1/ 2nR +− , 2 2/ iu m∂ ∂ = 
2 2/ iU m∂ ∂ =0. (b) The bracket before ( )( / ) /( / )Ln c r C R  in (A3) is negative when 
( / ) /( / )c r C R  is arbitrarily small. ( )( / ) /( / )Ln c r C R  is then also negative with arbitrarily high 
absolute value. Hence /u m∂ ∂ >0. (c) The bracket before ( )( / ) /( / )Ln c r C R  in (A4) is positive 
when ( / ) /( / )c r C R  is arbitrarily large, causing arbitrarily large ( )( / ) /( / )Ln c r C R  and 
/U m∂ ∂ >0. (d) and (e) See Appendix 1. (f) Follows from (11). 
 17
 
Although the agents’ utilities decrease in the intensity of the contest for a broad set of parameter 
values, increased intensity can benefit the attacker, and even the defender, when advantaged 
with a sufficiently low unit cost of investment compared with that of the opponent. But ceteris 
paribus, adding several components to the series system benefits the attacker, and not the 
defender. Let us consider two examples. 
 
Example 1. Inserting mi=1 and n=2 into (11) gives 
22 2 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
2
,
C C C C c c C c c c C c C c C c
R R R R r r R r r r R r R r R r
u r U R
c C c C c C c C
r R r R r R r R
     − + + + +          = =
       + + + +              
 (15) 
The defender’s utility is positive when 21 2 /C C R >
2
1 2 /c c r . Otherwise the defender gives up, 
does not invest, and earns zero utility, while the attacker earns a utility equal to the value of the 
system and invests arbitrarily little. The attacker’s utility is always positive, but making the 
attacker maximally disadvantaged gives 
1
2
C
C
Lim u r
→∞
→∞
= , 
1
2
0
C
C
Lim U
→∞
→∞
= , using L’Hopital’s rule. For a 
series system of two components where mi=1, the product of the defense inefficiencies must be 
less than the product of the attack inefficiencies in order for the defender to earn positive utility. 
Series systems are hard to defend, and the defender needs superior defense efficiencies in order 
to ensure overall system reliability. The numerator in the attacker’s utility in (15) contains the 
product of the defense inefficiencies raised to both the third and the fourth power, while the 
product of the attack inefficiencies are not raised to more than the second power. 
 
Example 2. To place the attacker in a more disadvantaged situation, inserting c1/r=c2/r=1, 
C1/R=C2/R=n=2, mi=m into (9) and (11) gives 
2 1 2 1
1 2 1 23 3 3 3
4 2 4 (1 2 2 ) 1 3 2 2 (1 ), , ,
(1 2 ) (1 2 ) (1 2 ) (1 2 )
m m m m m m
m m m m
m m m mt t T T u r U R
− ++ − + × + −= = = = = =+ + + +  (16) 
For m=1, (16) gives t1=t2=4/27, T1=T2=2/27, u=4r/27, U=7R/27, with a utility advantage when 
R=r for the attacker for the series system despite the double attack inefficiencies. For m=2, (16) 
gives t1=t2=32/125, T1=T2=16/125, u=16r/125 and U=-19R/125, which implies a corner solution 
with u=r and U=0. High attack inefficiencies and high m induce a high toll on the attacker in 
series systems. For this series system, where the attacker is sufficiently disadvantaged with high 
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attack inefficiencies, and the intensity of the contest is sufficiently high, a corner solution 
emerges with maximum utility r to the defender and minimum utility zero to the attacker. 
 
Fig. 3 shows the four investments and two utilities (divided by system value) as functions of the 
defense inefficiency c1/r when n=2 and c2/r=C1/R=C2/R=mi=1. Both the defender’s investments 
t1 and t2 decrease in c1/r, as stated in Proposition 2. The attacker’s investment T2 equals t2 for 
these parameters, which decreases, while T1 increases in c1/r when 1 /c r < 1 /C R  (Proposition 
2). The defender’s utility decreases to zero when c1/r=1, and the attacker’s utility increases in 
c1/r. When c1/r>1, the defender earns zero, and the attacker earns one. Division with 2 in U/2R is 
for scaling purposes. 
 
Fig. 4 keeps the same parameters except doubles C2/R to C2/R=2. The defender benefits since 
the range of positive utility increases to 0<c1/r<2. The attacker reduces T2 as c1/r increases, 
substituting to attacking component 1 (Proposition 2), causing the defender to increase t1. 
Observe the inverse U form for T1. When c1/r is small, the defense t1 is substantial, and the 
attacker chooses low T1. As c1/r increases toward 2, the defender decreases t1 so substantially 
that the attacker can cash in on its investment. The defender faces a substantial threat, gives 
gradually up, and the attacker benefits. Inverse U form for investments has also been reported by 
Hausken (2006). The insight is that a contestant invests little when the threat is negligible or 
overwhelming, and invests maximum when the threat is intermediate. 
 
4 Series system with budget constraints 
Assume that the defender and attacker have budget constraints b and B, 
1 1
,
n n
i i i i
i i
c t b C T B
= =
≤ ≤∑ ∑  (17) 
If b and B are large, the constraints are not binding, and the previous analysis applies. This 
section assumes that both the constraints are binding. (The two cases when one constraint is 
binding and the other not binding, are cumbersome to analyze.) Assume without loss of 
generality that the investments for the n’th component are 
1 1
1 1,
n n
i i i i
i i
n n
n n
b c t B C T
t T
c C
− −
= =
− −
= =
∑ ∑
 (18) 
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The investments for components 1,…,n-1 are determined by optimization. The analysis is 
analytically intractable for general mi, so we set mi=1. In order to differentiate with respect to t1 
and T1 for the first component, we write the utilities in (5) and (6) as 
1
1 1
2
1 1
1
11 11 11 1
221 1
1 1 1 1
2 2
1
1 1
2
1
11 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
2 2
, , ,
1
n
i i
i
n n
n i
i in n
ii i i
i i i i
i i
n n
n
i i
i
n
n n
i i i i
i i
n n
b c t c t
c ttu r s b s s c t
t T t Tb c t c t B C T C T
c C
b c t c t
ctU R s
t T b c t c t B C T C T
c C
−
=
− −
− −
==
= =
−
=
− −
= =
− −
= − = =+ +− − − −
+
 − −  = − + − − − − + 
∑
∑∏∑ ∑
∑
∑ ∑
1
1
2
,
n
i i
i
B S C T
−
=
 − =
∑
 (19) 
where s11,s1,S1 are not functions of t1 and T1. Setting the derivatives with respect to t1 and T1 
equal to zero, 1/u t∂ ∂ =0 and 1/U T∂ ∂ =0, and solving gives 
1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( )[ ( ) ( )]
,
2 ( ) ( )( )
( )[ ( ) ( )] ( )
,
[2 ( ) ( )( )] ( )
n n
n n n
n n
n n n
b s c B S C b s
t
c c B S c C C c b s
c B S c B S C b s t C b sT
C c c B S c C C c b s T c B S
− − + −= − + + −
− − + − −= =− + + − −
 (20) 
In order to differentiate with respect to t2 and T2 for the second component, we write the utilities 
in (5) and (6) as 
1
2 2
1, 2
1 1
2
22 22 21 1
1, 21, 22 2
2 2 2 2
1, 2 1, 2
1
2 2
1, 2
2
22 1
2 2
2 2 2
1, 2
, , ,
1
n
i i
i i
n n
n i
i in n
i ii i i i
i i i i
i i i i
n n
n
i i
i i
n
n
i i
i i
n
b c t c t
c ttu r s b s s c t
t T t Tb c t c t B C T C T
c C
b c t c t
ctU R s
t T b c t c t B C T
c
−
= ≠
− −
− −
= ≠= ≠
= ≠ = ≠
−
= ≠
−
= ≠
− −
= − = =+ +− − − −
+
− −
= − + − − −
+
∑
∑∏∑ ∑
∑
∑
1
21
1, 2
2
1, 2
,
n
i in
i i
i i
i i
n
B S C T
C T
C
−
−
= ≠
= ≠
     − =  −   
∑∑
(21) 
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where s22,s2,S2 are not functions of t2 and T2. Setting the derivatives with respect to t2 and T2 
equal to zero, 2/u t∂ ∂ =0 and 2/U T∂ ∂ =0, and solving gives 
2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
( )[ ( ) ( )]
,
2 ( ) ( )( )
( )[ ( ) ( )] ( )
,
[2 ( ) ( )( )] ( )
n n
n n n
n n
n n n
b s c B S C b s
t
c c B S c C C c b s
c B S c B S C b s t C b sT
C c c B S c C C c b s T c B S
− − + −= − + + −
− − + − −= =− + + − −
 (22) 
The analysis for n=2 components gives 1 1 /t c b = 1 1 /T C B  and 2 2 /t c b = 2 2 /T C B , and the analysis 
for n=3 components additionally gives 3 3 /t c b = 3 3 /T C B . We thus generally set  
/i it c b = /i iT C B  and verify the solution below. Observe the difference to /i it c r = /i iT C R  in 
Proposition 1 where the system values are replaced by the budget constraints. Solving 
/i it c b = /i iT C B  together with the ratios in (20) and (22) gives S1=s1B/b and S2=s2B/b, which are 
inserted into (20) and (22) to yield 
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
( )( ) ( )( ) /
, , ,
2 ( ) [2 ( ) ] /
( )( ) ( )( ) /
, ,
2 ( ) [2 ( ) ] /
n n n n
n n n n n n
n n n n
n n n n n n
b s c B C b c B b s c B C b t C Bt T
c c B c C C c b C b c c B c C C c b T c b
b s c B C b c B b s c B C b t C Bt T
c c B c C C c b C b c c B c C C c b T c b
− + − += = =+ + + +
− + − += = =+ + + +
 (23) 
Solving (23) with respect to s1 and s2 gives 
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
/ / / /
,
/ / / /n nn n n n
c b C B c b C B
s b c t c t s b c t c t
c b C B c b C B
+ += − − = − −+ +  (24) 
Inserting s1, S1=s1B/b, and 1t = 1 1 1/T bC Bc  into the first order conditions for t1 and T1 confirm 
that these equal to zero. The analysis for components 2,…,n-1 is analogous. The definitions of s1 
and s2 in (19) and (21) imply 1 1 1s c t+ = 2 2 2s c t+ . Hence (24) implies 
1 1
2 1
2 2
/ /
/ /
c b C Bt t
c b C B
+= +  (25) 
which gives the ratio of the investments in components 1 and 2 for the defender. The defender’s 
investment in component 2 is inverse proportional to the sum of the unit costs, divided by the 
respective constraints, of investing in component 1. Generalizing to components i and j gives 
/ /
/ /
i i
j i
j j
c b C B
t t
c b C B
+= +  (26) 
Inserting (26) when i=1 into (24) and applying the definition of s1 from (19) gives 
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1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
2 2
1
1 1 1
2
/ / / /
/ / / /
1
/
/ ( / / )
/ /
n n
j j j n
j j j j n n
n
j
j j j
c b C B c b C Bs c t c t b c t c t
c b C B c b C B
t
c b
c b c b C B
c b C B
− −
= =
=
+ += = = − −+ +
⇒ =
+ + +
∑ ∑
∑
 (27) 
Generalizing to component i gives 
1
1 1
/ /1 , , ,
/ / / /
/ ( / / )
/ /
/ /
, 1
/ / / /
i i i
i i in
j i i i i i
i i i
j j j
j ì
n n
i i
i ii i i i
c b t C B
t T t
c b C B t T c b C B
c b c b C B
c b C B
C B C B
u r b U R B
c b C B c b C B
=≠
= =
= = =+ ++ + +
 = − = − − + + 
∑
∏ ∏
 (28) 
 
Proposition 5. (a) With budget constraints the ratio of the investments for each component, and 
the contest success function for each component, are the same as without budget constraints 
when replacing the system values r and R with the budget constraints b and B, 
/i it T = ( / ) /( / )i iC B c b . (b) With budget constraints the utilities are the same as without budget 
constraints replacing r with b and R with B in the contest success function, and replacing the 
expenditures with the budget constraints. (c) The investments decrease in n. (d) For the 
defender, / ( / )i it c b∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i jt c b∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i it C B∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i jt C B∂ ∂ >0. For the 
attacker, / ( / )i iT C B∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i jT C B∂ ∂ >0, / ( / )i iT c b∂ ∂ >0, / ( / )i jT c b∂ ∂ <0, i,j=1,…,n, 
i≠ j. (e) The defender’s utility decreases in n. (f) The attacker’s utility increases in n. (g) When 
n,ci/b,Ci/B,b,B in (28) are such that u<0 and U>0, which implies u=0 and U=R, the series 
system is 100% insecure. When n,ci/b,Ci/B,b,B in (28) are such that u>0 and U<0, which 
implies u=r and U=0, the series system is 100% secure. 
 
Proof. (a) Follows from comparing (28) and (9). (b) Follows from comparing (28) with (5), (6), 
(11). (c) Since ( / ) /( / / )j j jc b c b C B+ >0 in (28), adding an additional component adds yet 
another ratio in the denominator, which causes lower ti and lower Ti. (d) Follows from 
differentiating (28). (The signs of the first derivatives are observed straightforwardly from (28), 
and are not set up due to space constraints.) (e) Since ( / ) /( / / )i i iC B c b C B+ <1 in (28), adding 
an additional component causes multiplication with yet another ratio less than one, which causes 
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lower u. (f) Since the product decreases in n, one minus the product increases in n. (g) 
Follows from (28). 
 
The results in Proposition 5 are mostly similar to the results in Propositions 1-4 without budget 
constraints. The budget constraints can indeed have a significant impact, especially for an agent 
who would otherwise choose a much higher investment. An agent with a large system value, but 
a low budget, is especially constrained. The signs of the derivatives for the investments in 
Proposition 5c are equivalent to the signs in Proposition 2b, with two exceptions. First, 
/ ( / )i it C B∂ ∂ <0 with budget constraints, while / ( / )i it C R∂ ∂ <0 when /ic r < /iC R  without 
budget constraints. Second, / ( / )i iT c b∂ ∂ >0 with budget constraints, while / ( / )i iT c r∂ ∂ >0 
when /iC R > /ic r  without budget constraints. Both these exceptions concern the impact of the 
other agent’s unit cost for the same component, which has more indirect impact than an agent’s 
own unit cost on own investment. 
 
Let us consider the same special cases as above. First, inserting Ci/B=ci/b and b=B into (28) 
gives 
1 1
1 1, , 1 ,
/ 2 2
n n
i i i i i in n
i ii
rt T u b U R b c t C T b
nc b = =
 = = = − = − − = =   ∑ ∑  (29) 
Comparing (29) with (13), both agents would invest more with budget constraints when 
b > 1/ 2nrn + . However, (13) implies
1
n
i i
i
c t
=
∑ = 1/ 2nrn + , so such a budget constraint would not be 
binding, and the agents always invest less with budget constraints when equipped with equal 
unit costs and budgets. Second, inserting ci=c and Ci=C into (28) gives 
1 1 / /, , , 1
/ / / / / /
n n
i i
C B C Bt T u r b U R B
nc b nC B c b C B c b C B
    = = = − = − −     + +    
 (30) 
which can be compared with (14). Third, inserting n=2 into (28) gives 
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1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
/1 , ,
/ / // /
/ /
, 1
i
i i i
i i i
i j
j j
c b
t T t
c b C B C Bc b c b
c b C B
C C C C
B B B Bu r b U R B
c C c C c C c C
b B b B b B b B
= =++ +
   = − = − −       + + + +            
 (31) 
which can be compared with (15). 
b
Lim u r b
→∞
= −  and 
B
Lim U R B
→∞
= − , but unlimited budgets 
cause the solution in (15). Fourth, inserting c1/b=c2/b=1, C1/B=C2/B=n=2 into (28) gives 
1 1 1 1 2 4 2 5, , , 1
2 2 4 3 9 3 9
n n
i i
r Rt T u r b b U R B B
n n
    = = = = = − = − = − − = −         
 (32) 
which can be compared with (16). The attacker enjoys a utility advantage when R=r and B=b for 
the series system despite the double attack inefficiencies, as without budget constraints. 
 
5 Parallel system 
The reliability of a parallel system equals one minus the product of the component 
unreliabilities, that is ( )
1
1 1
n
i
i
p
=
− −∏ . Applying (3), and analogously to (5), we model the 
defender’s utility as 
11
1 1
mn ni
i
i im mi i
ii i i
t
u r c t
t T ==
  = − − −   +   ∑∏  (33) 
Analogously to (6), the attacker’s utility is 
11
1
mn ni
i
i im mi i
ii i i
t
U R C T
t T ==
 = − − +  ∑∏  (34) 
The 2n FOCs are 
1 1
2 2
1 1
0, 0
( ) ( )
m mj jm m m mn ni i i i
j ji i i i i i
i im m m m m m m mi i j j i i j j
j ji ii i i ij j j jj i j i
T Tm t T m T tu Ur c R C
t Tt T t Tt T t T
− −
= =≠ ≠
∂ ∂= − = = − =∂ ∂+ ++ +∏ ∏  (35) 
Compared with (7) for the series system, only one variable in the numerator gets changed for 
each FOC in (35). For the FOCs for it  and iT , the change is from 
m j
jt  to 
m j
jT  inside the product 
sign for j=1,…,n, j≠ i. The impact of this apparently minor change is substantial. Also for the 
parallel system the FOCs give it = /i i iT rC Rc , which we formulate as follows. 
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Proposition 1P. The ratio of investments for each component is inverse proportional to the ratio 
of the unit costs to the system value, /i it T = ( / ) /( / )i iC R c r , unrelated to that of the other 
components. The investment expenditures relative to the system value for the defender and the 
attacker are equal for each component, that is /i it c r = /i iT C R , regardless of the parameter mi. 
 
Solving (35) gives 
1
2
1
1
2
1
( / )( / ) ( / ) /
,
/(( / ) ( / ) ) ( / ) ( / )
( / )( / ) ( / ) /
,
/ /(( / ) ( / ) ) ( / ) ( / )
m jm m ni i
ji i i i i
i m m m mi i j j
j i ii i j jj i
m jm m ni i
ji i i i i
i m m m mi i j j
j i i i ii i j jj i
c rm c r C R t C R
t
T c rc r C R c r C R
c rm C R c r t C R
T
t T C R c rc r C R c r C R
−
=≠
−
=≠
= =+ +
= =+ ++ +
∏
∏
 (36) 
Just as for the FOCs, only one variable in the numerator gets changed for each variable in (36), 
compared with the series system in (9). For it  and iT , the change is from ( / )
m j
jC R  to 
( / )m jjc r  inside the product sign for j=1,…,n, j≠ i. 
 
Proposition 2P. (a) The investments decrease in n. (b) Assume mi=mj=1. For the defender, 
/ ( / )i it c r∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i jt c r∂ ∂ >0, / ( / )i it C R∂ ∂ >0 when /ic r > /iC R , / ( / )i jt C R∂ ∂ <0. For 
the attacker, / ( / )i iT C R∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i jT C R∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i iT c r∂ ∂ <0 when /iC R < /ic r , 
/ ( / )i jT c r∂ ∂ >0, i,j=1,…,n, i≠ j. 
 
Proof. (a) Since ( / ) /(( / ) ( / ) )m m mj j jj j jc r c r C R+ <1 in (36), adding an additional component 
causes multiplication with yet another ratio less than one, which causes lower ti and lower Ti. (b) 
See Appendix 2. 
 
Both agents invest less when the number of components increases. It is more difficult for the 
attacker to attack many components in a parallel system. And, the defender benefits without 
having to invest much. The four inequalities for the defender in Proposition 2P for the parallel 
system correspond to the four inequalities for the attacker in Proposition 2 for the series system, 
obtained by permuting capital and regular letters. That is, iT  is replaced with it , iC  is replaced 
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with ic , jC  is replaced with jc , ic  is replaced with iC , and jc  is replaced with jC . 
Analogously, the four inequalities for the attacker in Proposition 2P correspond to the four 
inequalities for the defender in Proposition 2. This means that the advantage for the attacker in a 
series system gets replaced by an analogous advantage for the defender in a parallel system. 
 
Analogously, the defender invests less to defend component i when the defense inefficiency of 
component i increases. However, in contrast to the attacker, the defender invests more to defend 
component i when the defense inefficiency of component j increases. In contrast to series 
systems, the substitution effect applies strongly for the defender, but less so for the attacker. 
When the defender suffers defense inefficiency for component j, it substitutes to defending 
component i. The defender benefits from defending any of the components in a parallel system, 
and choosing the most cost effective defense is beneficial. The attacker needs to attack both 
components to reduce the reliability of the parallel system. It cannot substitute strongly from 
component j to component i when the inefficiency of component j increases (since 
/ ( / )i jT C R∂ ∂ <0) since that would increase the reliability of component j substantially due to 
substitution by the defender. Mathematically, observe in (36) that /jC R  is not present in the 
numerator of iT , while /jc r  is indeed present in the numerator of it . 
 
However, when choosing iT  and assuming mi=mj=1, the attacker is more negatively influenced 
by a high /iC R  than by a high /jC R . This can be interpreted as a moderate substitution effect 
also for the attack, for parallel systems. This can be seen from the four denominators in (36) 
which have one square bracket and one bracket that is not squared. For component i the 
investments it  and iT  have squared brackets in the denominators for the inefficiencies /ic r  and 
/iC R , which cause reduced investment if these inefficiencies are large. We formulate this as a 
follows. 
 
Proposition 3P. In a parallel system the defender benefits more from the substitution effect than 
the attacker since defender benefits flow from defending any of the components, while attacker 
benefits flow from attacking all components. The defender is highly sensitive to the difference in 
the defense efficiencies for the components. The attacker is less sensitive to the difference in the 
attack efficiencies for the components. 
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Proposition 2P also states that when mi=mj=1, the attacker increases the investment iT  when 
/jc r  increases ( / ( / )i jT c r∂ ∂ >0). This is a natural consequence of the defender’s substitution 
effect. When the defense inefficiency /jc r  increases, the defender substitutes to defending 
component i, causing the attacker to increase iT  to attack component i, in order to reduce the 
overall reliability of the parallel system. Conversely, the defender decreases the investment it  
when /jC R  increases ( / ( / )i jt C R∂ ∂ <0). The reason is that increasing /jC R  causes reduced 
investment also of iT  for the attacker. To preserve /i it c r = /i iT C R  in Proposition 1P, it  
decreases too. 
 
To further illustrate the substitution effect, (36) implies 
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
1
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
m m m mm mj j j ji i
i i j j j i i j ji i
m mm m m mj ji i i i
j jj j i i i j j i i
m C R c r c r C R m C R c r C Rt T
t Tm C R c r c r C R m C R c r C R
−
−
+ +
= =+ + (37) 
for any two components i,j=1,…,n, i≠ j. Equation (37) follows from (10) by permuting capital 
and regular letters. Both agents’ investment ratios increases in /i jm m . When mi=mj=1, the ratio 
/i jT T  of the attacker’s investments increases in the sum of the inefficiencies of component j, 
and decreases in the sum of the inefficiencies of component i. The attacker is investment 
sensitive in a straightforward manner. However, when mi=mj=1, the defender’s investment ratio 
/i jt t  is impacted by two additional ratios. First, /i jC C  partly counterbalances the ratio of the 
sums of the inefficiencies, tilting the balance toward defending component i if the attack 
inefficiency of component i is large. Secondly, and more importantly, /j ic c  demonstrates the 
substitution effect where component i is defended more fiercely if the defense inefficiency of 
component j is large. 
 
Inserting (36) into (33) and (34) gives the utilities 
1 1
1 1
( / ) ( / )
1 1 ,
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
( / ) ( / )
1
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
m mnn i i
i i i
m m m mi i i i
i ii i i i
m mnn i i
i i i
m m m mi i i i
i ii i i i
m C R c r
u r
c r C R c r C R
m C R c r
U R
c r C R c r C R
= =
= =
  = − +   + +  
 = − + + 
∑ ∏
∑ ∏
 (38) 
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The defender utility u in (38) follows from the attacker utility U in (11) by permuting capital 
and regular letters. Analogously, the attacker utility U in (38) follows from the defender utility u 
in (11) by permuting capital and regular letters. The product 
1
( )
n
i=
⋅∏  causes high utility to the 
attacker of high defense inefficiencies. Subtraction of this product causes low utility to the 
defender. For the three benchmarks, inserting mi=0 into (36) and (38) gives 
10, 1 ,
2 2i i n n
Rt T u r U = = = − =    (39) 
In contrast to the series system, the defender’s utility increases concavely in the number of 
components for the parallel system, while the attacker’s utility decreases convexly in n. Second, 
inserting Ci/R=ci/r into (36) and (38) gives 
1
1 1
1 1, 1 1 , 1
2 22 / 2 2
n n
i i i
i i n n n
i ii
m m m
t T u r U R
c r+ = =
    = = = − + = −        ∑ ∑  (40) 
The attacker is strongly disadvantaged by both high mi and high n. The attacker’s utility reaches 
zero when 
1 2
n
i
i
m
=
∑ ≥1, which makes the n components 100% secure. The defender also suffers 
from high mi, but benefits from high n as shown in (A14). The sum 1
1
11
22
n
i
n
i
m
r −
=
 −  ∑ , when 
R=r, of the utilities decreases in mi, but increases in n since the defender benefits more than the 
attacker suffers as the number of components increases. For the third benchmark, inserting ci=c, 
Ci=C, mi=m into (36) and (38) gives 
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / ), ,
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
( / ) /( / ) 11 1 ,
( / ) /( / ) 1 ( / ) /( / ) 1
( / ) /( / ) 11
( / ) /( / ) 1 ( / ) /( / ) 1
m mn m mn
i in nm m m m
m
n
m
n
m C R c r m C R c rt T
c r C R c r C R
mn C R c r
u r
C R c r C R c r
mn C R c r
U R
C R c r C R c r
− −
+ += =+ +
    = − +  + +  
  = − + + 
 (41) 
 
Proposition 4P. (a) When Ci/R=ci/r, both agents’ utilities decrease linearly in mi. (b) When the 
attacker is advantaged with a sufficiently small ( / ) /( / )i iC R c r  for all i, U increases in mi=m. 
(c) When the defender is advantaged with a sufficiently large ( / ) /( / )i iC R c r  for all i, u 
increases in mi=m. (d) The attacker’s utility decreases in n. (e) The defender’s utility increases 
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in n. (f) When mi=m,n,ci/r,Ci/R in (38) are such that u<0 and U>0, which implies u=0 and 
U=R, the parallel system is 100% insecure. When mi=m,n,ci/r,Ci/R in (38) are such that u>0 
and U<0, which implies u=r and U=0, the parallel system is 100% secure. 
 
Proof. (a) Differentiating (40) gives / iu m∂ ∂ = 1/ 2nr +− , / iU m∂ ∂ = 1/ 2nR +− , 2 2/ iu m∂ ∂ = 
2 2/ iU m∂ ∂ =0. (b) The bracket before ( )( / ) /( / )Ln C R c r  in (A15) is negative when 
( / ) /( / )C R c r  is arbitrarily small. ( )( / ) /( / )Ln C R c r  is then also negative with arbitrarily high 
absolute value. Hence /U m∂ ∂ >0. (c) The bracket before ( )( / ) /( / )Ln C R c r  in (A16) is 
positive when ( / ) /( / )C R c r  is arbitrarily large, causing arbitrarily large ( )( / ) /( / )Ln C R c r  and 
/u m∂ ∂ >0. (d) and (e) Since the defender utility u in (38) follows from the attacker utility U in 
(11) by permuting capital and regular letters, the proof is equivalent with Appendix 1 permuting 
capital and regular letters. (f) Follows from (38). 
 
Although the agents’ utilities decrease in the intensity of the contest for a broad set of parameter 
values, increased intensity can benefit the defender, and even the attacker, when advantaged 
with a sufficiently low unit cost of investment compared with that of the opponent. But ceteris 
paribus, adding several components to the parallel system benefits the defender, and not the 
attacker. Let us consider two examples. 
 
Example 3. Inserting mi=1 and n=2 into (38) gives 
22 2 2
1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2
1 2
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
2
,
c C C c C C c C c C c c C Cc c
r R R r R R r R r R r r R R
u r U R
c C c C c C c C
r R r R r R r R
     + + + + −          = =
       + + + +              
 (42) 
which also follows from permuting capital and regular letters in (15). The attacker’s utility is 
positive when 21 2 /c c r >
2
1 2 /C C R . Otherwise the attacker earns zero utility and does not invest, 
while the defender earns a utility equal to the value of the system and invests arbitrarily little. 
The defender’s utility is always positive, but making the defender maximally disadvantaged 
gives 
1
2
c
c
Lim U R
→∞
→∞
= , 
1
2
0
c
c
Lim u
→∞
→∞
=  (L’Hopital’s rule). For a parallel system of two components 
where mi=1, the product of the attack inefficiencies must be less than the product of the defense 
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inefficiencies in order for the attacker to earn positive utility. Parallel systems are hard to 
attack, and the attacker needs superior attack efficiencies in order to ensure overall system 
reliability. The numerator in the defender’s utility in (42) contains the product of the attack 
inefficiencies raised to both the third and the fourth power, while the product of the defense 
inefficiencies are not raised to more than the second power. 
 
Example 4. To place the defender in a more disadvantaged situation, inserting c1/r=c2/r=n=2 and 
C1/R=C2/R=1, mi=m into (36) and (38) gives 
2 1 2 1
1 2 1 23 3 3 3
2 4 1 3 2 2 (1 ) 4 (1 2 2 ), , ,
(1 2 ) (1 2 ) (1 2 ) (1 2 )
m m m m m m
m m m m
m m m mt t T T u r U R
− ++ × + − + −= = = = = =+ + + +  (43) 
For m=1, (43) gives t1=t2=2/27, T1=T2=4/27, u=7r/27, U=4R/27, with a utility advantage when 
R=r for the defender for the parallel system despite the double defense inefficiencies. For m=2, 
(43) gives t1=t2=16/125, T1=T2=32/125, u=-19r/125 and U=16R/125, which implies a corner 
solution with u=0 and U=R. High defense inefficiencies and high m induce a high toll on the 
defender in parallel systems. For this parallel system, where the defender is sufficiently 
disadvantaged with high defense inefficiencies, and the intensity of the contest is sufficiently 
high, a corner solution emerges with maximum utility R to the attacker and minimum utility 
zero to the defender. 
 
Of course, permuting capital and regular letters for the six variables in the series systems 
simulations in section 4, gives equivalent simulations for the parallel system. The results for the 
defender (attacker) in the series system are equivalent to the results for the attacker (defender) in 
the parallel system with such permutation. To generate new interesting results, we keep the c1/r 
dependency in section 4, and the same parameters, without permutation. 
 
Fig. 5 shows the four investments and two utilities (divided by system value) as functions of the 
defense inefficiency c1/r with the same parameters as in Fig. 3, i.e. n=2 and 
c2/r=C1/R=C2/R=mi=1. Whereas Fig. 3 for the series system gives zero utility to the defender 
and a utility equal to the value of the system to the attacker when c1/r>1 (due to negative u in 
(15) where 2 21 2 1 2/ /C C R c c r−  is present), Fig. 5 for the parallel system gives zero utility to 
the attacker and a utility equal to the value of the system to the defender when c1/r<1 (due to 
negative U in (42) where 1 2 1 2c c C C−  is present). The defender is very vulnerable to high 
defense inefficiencies in series systems, since it has to defend both components. Conversely, the 
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attacker is very vulnerable to low defense inefficiencies in parallel systems, since it has to 
attack both components, and the defender substitutes the defense optimally across the two 
components. The defender’s investment t1 naturally decreases c1/r, but t2 increases in c1/r as the 
defender optimally substitutes to defending component 2 in a parallel system (Proposition 3P). 
The attacker’s investment T2 equals t2 for these parameters, which increases, while T1 decreases 
in c1/r when 1 /c r < 1 /C R  (Proposition 2P). The defender’s utility increases to one, and the 
attacker’s utility decreases to zero, as c1/r decreases to c1/r=1. Division with 2 in u/2r is for 
scaling purposes. 
 
Analogously to Fig. 4, Fig. 6 keeps the same parameters except doubles C2/R to C2/R=2. Also in 
Fig. 6 the defender benefits, and especially so since the range of maximum utility increases to 
0<c1/r<2. Let us consider c1/r>2. Despite the high defense inefficiency for component 1, the 
defender retains a substantial utility which decreases in c1/r. Conversely, the attacker’s utility 
increases in c1/r. The defender reduces t1 as c1/r increases, substituting to defending component 
2. This causes the attacker to increase T2, and in fact to decrease T1. The reason is that high c1/r 
causes component 2 to be the main source of high reliability for the defender, and the attacker 
must attack component 2 to reduce that high reliability. This illustrates how the parallel system 
benefits the defender, and not the attacker. 
 
6 Parallel system with budget constraints 
Assume that the defender and attacker have budget constraints b and B defined in (17) and that 
the investments for the n’th component are as in (18). In order to differentiate with respect to t1 
and T1 for the first component, we write the utilities in (33) and (34) as 
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 (44) 
where q11,q1,Q1 are not functions of t1 and T1. Setting the derivatives with respect to t1 and T1 
equal to zero, 1/u t∂ ∂ =0 and 1/U T∂ ∂ =0, and solving gives 
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( )[ ( ) ( )]
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− − + − −= =− + + − −
 (45) 
In order to differentiate with respect to t2 and T2 for the second component, we write the utilities 
in (5) and (6) as 
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(46) 
where q22,q2,Q2 are not functions of t2 and T2. Setting the derivatives with respect to t2 and T2 
equal to zero, 2/u t∂ ∂ =0 and 2/U T∂ ∂ =0, and solving gives 
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 (47) 
As in section 4b for the series system, and analogously to the case without budget constraints, 
we set /i it c b = /i iT C B  and verify the solution below. Observe the difference to /i it c r = /i iT C R  
in Proposition 1P where the system values are replaced by the budget constraints. Solving 
/i it c b = /i iT C B  together with the ratios in (45) and (47) gives q1=Q1b/B and q2=Q2b/B, which 
are inserted into (45) and (47) to yield 
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
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 (48) 
Solving (48) with respect to Q1 and Q2 gives 
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
/ / / /
,
/ / / /n nn n n n
c b C B c b C B
Q B C T C T Q B C T C T
c b C B c b C B
+ += − − = − −+ +  (49) 
Inserting Q1, q1=Q1b/B, and 1t = 1 1 1/T bC Bc  into the first order conditions for t1 and T1 confirm 
that these equal to zero. The analysis for components 2,…,n-1 is analogous. The definitions of 
Q1 and Q2 in (44) and (46) imply 1 1 1Q C T+ = 2 2 2Q C T+ . Hence (49) implies 
1 1
2 1
2 2
/ /
/ /
c b C B
T T
c b C B
+= +  (50) 
which gives the ratio of the investments in components 1 and 2 for the attacker. The attacker’s 
investment in component 2 is inverse proportional to the sum of the unit costs, divided by the 
respective constraints, of investing in component 1. Generalizing to components i and j gives 
/ /
/ /
i i
j i
j j
c b C B
T T
c b C B
+= +  (51) 
Inserting (51) when i=1 into (49) and applying the definition of s1 from (44) gives 
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c b C B
− −
= =
=
+ += = = − −+ +
⇒ =
+ + +
∑ ∑
∑
 (52) 
Generalizing to component i gives  
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1
1 1
/ /1 , , ,
/ / / /
/ ( / / )
/ /
/ /
1 ,
/ / / /
i i i
i i in
j i i i i i
i i i
j j j
j ì
n n
i i
i ii i i i
C B T c b
T t T
C b c b t T C B c b
C B c b C B
c b C B
c b c b
u r b U R B
c b C B c b C B
=≠
= =
= = =+ ++ + +
 = − − = − + + 
∑
∏ ∏
 (53) 
Observe how the analysis and results for the parallel system in this sections follows from the 
analysis and results for the series system in section 4b by permuting capital and regular letters. 
 
Proposition 5P. (a) With budget constraints the ratio of the investments for each component, 
and the contest success function for each component, are the same as without budget constraints 
when replacing the system values r and R with the budget constraints b and B, 
/i it T = ( / ) /( / )i iC B c b . (b) With budget constraints the utilities are the same as without budget 
constraints replacing r with b and R with B in the contest success function, and replacing the 
expenditures with the budget constraints. (c) The investments decrease in n. (d) For the 
defender, / ( / )i it c b∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i jt c b∂ ∂ >0, / ( / )i it C B∂ ∂ >0, / ( / )i jt C B∂ ∂ <0. For the 
attacker, / ( / )i iT C B∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i jT C B∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i iT c b∂ ∂ <0, / ( / )i jT c b∂ ∂ >0, i,j=1,…,n, 
i≠ j. (e) The defender’s utility increases in n. (f) The attacker’s utility decreases in n. (g) When 
n,ci/b,Ci/B,b,B in (53) are such that u<0 and U>0, which implies u=0 and U=R, the parallel 
system is 100% insecure. When n,ci/b,Ci/B,b,B in (53) are such that u>0 and U<0, which 
implies u=r and U=0, the parallel system is 100% secure. 
 
Proof. (a) Follows from comparing (53) and (36). (b) Follows from comparing (53) with (33), 
(34), (38). (c) Since ( / ) /( / / )j j jC B c b C B+ >0 in (53), adding an additional component adds 
yet another ratio in the denominator, which causes lower ti and lower Ti. (d) Follows from 
differentiating (53). (The signs of the first derivatives are observed straightforwardly from (53), 
and are not set up due to space constraints.) (e) Since ( / ) /( / / )i i ic b c b C B+ <1 in (53), adding 
an additional component causes multiplication with yet another ratio less than one, which causes 
higher u. (f) Follows since the product decreases in n. (g) Follows from (53). 
 
The results in Proposition 5P are mostly similar to the results in Propositions 1P-4P without 
budget constraints, and follow from Proposition 5P when permuting capital with regular letters. 
The budget constraints can indeed have a significant impact, especially for an agent who would 
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otherwise choose a much higher investment. An agent with a large system value, but a low 
budget, is especially constrained. The signs of the derivatives for the investments in Proposition 
5Pc are equivalent to the signs in Proposition 2Pb, with two exceptions. First, / ( / )i it C B∂ ∂ >0 
with budget constraints, while / ( / )i it C R∂ ∂ >0 when /ic r > /iC R  without budget constraints. 
Second, / ( / )i iT c b∂ ∂ <0 with budget constraints, while / ( / )i iT c r∂ ∂ <0 when /iC R < /ic r  
without budget constraints. Both these exceptions concern the impact of the other agent’s unit 
cost for the same component, which has more indirect impact than an agent’s own unit cost on 
own investment. 
 
Let us consider the same special cases as above. First, inserting Ci/B=ci/b and b=B into (53) 
gives 
1 1
1 1, 1 , ,
/ 2 2
n n
i i i i i in n
i ii
Rt T u r b U B c t C T b
nc b = =
 = = = − − = − = =   ∑ ∑  (54) 
Comparing (54) with (40), both agents would invest more with budget constraints when 
b > 1/ 2nrn + . However, (40) implies
1
n
i i
i
c t
=
∑ = 1/ 2nrn + , so such a budget constraint would not be 
binding, and the agents always invest less with budget constraints when equipped with equal 
unit costs and budgets. Second, inserting ci=c and Ci=C into (53) gives 
1 1 / /, , 1 ,
/ / / / / /
n n
i i
c b c bt T u r b U R B
nc b nC B c b C B c b C B
    = = = − − = −     + +    
 (55) 
which can be compared with (41). Third, inserting n=2 into (53) gives 
1 2 1 2
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
/1 , ,
/ / // /
/ /
1 ,
i
i i i
i i i
i j
j j
C B
T t T
c b C B c bC B C b
c b C B
c c c c
b b b bu r b U R B
c C c C c C c C
b B b B b B b B
= =++ +
   = − − = −       + + + +            
 (56) 
which can be compared with (42). 
b
Lim u r b
→∞
= −  and 
B
Lim U R B
→∞
= − , but unlimited budgets 
cause the solution in (42). Fourth, inserting c1/b=c2/b=n=2, C1/B=C2/B=1 into (53) gives 
1 1 1 1 2 5 4, , 1 ,
2 4 2 3 9 9
n
i i
r Rt T u r b b U B
n n
  = = = = = − − = − = −     
 (57) 
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which can be compared with (43). The defender enjoys a utility advantage when R=r and B=b 
for the parallel system despite the double defense inefficiencies, as without budget constraints. 
 
7 Series system of parallel subsystems  
Consider the n parallel subsystems s times in series in Fig. 7. The system reliability is 
1 1
1 1
mijs n
ij
m mij ij
i j ij ij
t
p
t T= =
    = − −  +  
∏ ∏  (58) 
and inserting into the utilities in (1) and (2) gives 
1 11 1
1 11 1
1 1 ,
1 1 1
mijs n s n
ij
ij ijm mij ij
i ji j ij ij
mijs n s n
ij
ij ijm mij ij
i ji j ij ij
t
u r c t
t T
t
U R C T
t T
= == =
= == =
    = − − −  +  
      = − − − −   +   
∑∑∏ ∏
∑∑∏ ∏
 (59) 
The defender has sn free choice variables tij. The attacker has sn free choice variables Tij. There 
are 2sn FOCs. To determine the FOCs for t11 and T11 we write (59) as 
11
11
3 411 11
1 111 11
11
11
3 411 11
1 111 11
1
1
3 41 1
2 1 1
1 1 ,
1 1 1 ,
1 , 1 1
m s n
ij ijm m
i j
m s n
ij ijm m
i j
mqkmn k
qkk
m m m mk k qk qk
k k k qk qk
tu r S S c t
t T
tU R S S C T
t T
tt
S S
t T t T
= =
= =
=
  = − − −   +  
   = − − − −     +   
  = − = − −  + +  
∑∑
∑∑
∏
2 1
s n
q k= =
    
∏ ∏
 (60) 
where S3 and S4 are not functions of t11 and T11. Differentiating with respect to t11 and T11 gives 
1 111 11 11 11
11 11 11 11 11 11
3 4 11 3 4 112 211 11 11 11
11 1111 11 11 11
0, 0
( ) ( )
m m m m
m m m m
m t T m T tu Ur S S c R S S C
t Tt T t T
− −∂ ∂= − = = − =∂ ∂+ +  (61) 
Solving gives 11t = 11 11 11/T rC Rc  and 
1 111 11 11 11
11 11 11 11 11 11
11 3 4 11 3 42 211 11 11 11
11 11 11 11
11 11
11 11
11 11 11 11
11 11 11 11
( / ) ( / ) ( / ) ( / )
, ,
(( / ) ( / ) ) (( / ) ( / ) )
( / )( / )
( / ) ( / ) (
m m m m
m m m m
m mij ijm m
ij ij
m m m m m mij ij
ij ij
m c r C R m C R c rt S S T S S
c r C R c r C R
t C Rt C R
t T c r C R t T c
− −
= =+ +
= ⇒ =+ + + / ) ( / )m mij ijij ijr C R+
 (62) 
where the general ratio follows since FOCs analogous to (61) exist for any pair of tij and Tij. 
Inserting the general ratio in (62) into (60), and S3 and S4 into (62), gives 
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1
1
3 41 1
2 2 11 1
1 111 11
111 11 11
11 211 11 1 1
211 11 1 1
( / )( / )
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∏ ∏
∏ ∏ ∏
 (63) 
Generalizing to component ij gives 
1
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1
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( / ) ( / )
(( / ) ( / ) )
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  − + + 
∏ ∏ ∏
(64) 
and inserting into (59) gives the utilities. Taking the limits as n and s approach infinity, (64) and 
(59) imply 
0,
0,
ij ijn n n n
ij ijs s s s
Limt LimT LimU Limu r
Limt LimT Limu LimU R
→∞ →∞ →∞ →∞
→∞ →∞ →∞ →∞
= = = =
= = = =  (65) 
 
Proposition 6. Infinitely many components n in parallel causes maximum utility u=r to the 
defender and minimum utility U=0 to the attacker regardless of the finite number s of parallel 
subsystems in series. Conversely, infinitely many components s in series causes minimum utility 
u=0 to the defender and maximum utility U=R to the attacker regardless of the finite number n 
of components in parallel in each subsystem. The investments ti and Ti approach zero 
asymptotically as n or s approaches infinity. 
 
Proof. Follows from (59), (64), and (65). 
 
Inserting cij=cj, Cij=Cj, mij=mj for all i=1,…,s into (64), which means that component j in each of 
the s parallel subsystems has equal unit costs of defense and attack, and equal intensity, gives 
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 (66) 
Conversely, inserting cij=ci, Cij=Ci, mij=mi for all j=1,…,n into (64), which means that all the n 
components within each parallel subsystem have equal unit costs of defense and attack, and 
equal intensity, gives 
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 (67) 
The joint assumption of (66) and (67) where cij=c, Cij=C, mij=m for all i=1,…,s, j=1,…,n, which 
means that all the sn components have the same unit costs of defense and attack, and equal 
intensity, gives 
11 11
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1s−  
 (68) 
If C/R=c/r, which means that the attacker’s ratio of unit cost to system value equals the 
defender’s ratio of unit cost to system value, (68) and the utilities in (59) become 
1
1 1
1
1 1
1
1 1
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2 / 2
1 1 11 1 ,
2 2 2
1 1 11 1 1
2 2 2
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ij ij n n
s s
n n n
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 = = −  
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    = − − − −         
 (69) 
Assume that C/R=c/wr and m=1. If w>1, the defender is disadvantaged with a c/r that is w times 
as high as C/R for the attacker. Conversely, if w<1, the attacker is disadvantaged. Then (68) and 
(59) become 
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 (70) 
 
8 Parallel system of series subsystems 
Consider the s series subsystems n times in parallel in Fig. 8. The system reliability is 
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and inserting into the utilities in (1) and (2) gives 
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To determine the FOCs for t11 and T11 we write (72) as 
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where Q3 and Q4 are not functions of t11 and T11. Differentiating with respect to t11 and T11 gives 
1 111 11 11 11
11 11 11 11 11 11
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Solving gives 11t = 11 11 11/T rC Rc  and 
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where the general ratio follows since FOCs analogous to (74) exist for any pair of tij and Tij. 
Equations (74) and (75) are equivalent to (61) and (62) substituting S3S4 with Q3Q4. Inserting the 
general ratio in (75) into (73), and Q3 and Q4 into (75), gives 
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Permuting capital and regular letters, Q3 follows from S3, and Q4 follows from S4. Generalizing 
to component ij gives 
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(77) 
and inserting into (72) gives the utilities. Taking the limits as n and s approach infinity, (77) and 
(72) imply 
0,
0,
ij ijn n n n
ij ijs s s s
Limt LimT Limu LimU R
Limt LimT LimU Limu r
→∞ →∞ →∞ →∞
→∞ →∞ →∞ →∞
= = = =
= = = =  (78) 
 
Proposition 7. Infinitely many components n in series causes minimum utility u=r to the 
defender and maximum utility U=R to the attacker regardless of the finite number s of series 
subsystems in parallel. Conversely, infinitely many components s in parallel causes maximum 
utility u=r to the defender and minimum utility U=0 to the attacker regardless of the finite 
number n of components in series in each subsystem. The investments ti and Ti approach zero 
asymptotically as n or s approaches infinity. 
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Proof. Follows from (72), (77), and (78). 
 
Inserting cij=cj, Cij=Cj, mij=mj for all i=1,…,s into (77), which means that component j in each of 
the s series subsystems has equal unit costs of defense and attack, and equal intensity, gives 
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 (79) 
Conversely, inserting cij=ci, Cij=Ci, mij=mi for all j=1,…,n into (77), which means that all the n 
components within each series subsystem have equal unit costs of defense and attack, and equal 
intensity, gives 
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 (80) 
The joint assumption of (79) and (80) where cij=c, Cij=C, mij=m for all i=1,…,s, j=1,…,n, which 
means that all the sn components have the same unit costs of defense and attack, and equal 
intensity, gives 
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 (81) 
If C/R=c/r, which means that the attacker’s ratio of unit cost to system value equals the 
defender’s ratio of unit cost to system value, (81) and the utilities in (72) become 
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 (82) 
The investments in (82) and (69) are equivalent since (81) is equivalent to (68) when C/R=c/r. 
The utilities are different since (72) differ from (59). Observe how u in (82) follows from U in 
(69) replacing R with r, and conversely, how U in (82) follows from u in (69) replacing r with R. 
The defender prefers to increase n in (69) and to increase s in (82). The next proposition 
specifies the defender’s preference when s=n. 
 
Proposition 8. With equivalent components, equal unit costs for defender and attacker, i.e. 
C/R=c/r, equal intensity m for all components, and equally many components in series and 
parallel, i.e. s=n, the defender always prefers n parallel subsystems n times in series rather than 
n series subsystems n times in parallel, and conversely for the attacker. 
 
Proof. Requiring that the defender’s utility in (69) is larger than the defender’s utility in (82) 
implies 1/2 2n n− −+ <1 which is always satisfied when n>1. (When s=n=1 there is one component 
and the systems are equivalent.) 
 
This means that if the defender can control system configurations, series subsystems should be 
avoided even when multiple of these in parallel are present. If possible, each component should 
be supplemented with multiple components in parallel, and these parallel subsystems should 
then be linked in series.  
 
Assume that C/R=c/wr and m=1. If w>1, the defender is disadvantaged with a c/r that is w times 
as high as C/R for the attacker. Conversely, if w<1, the attacker is disadvantaged. Then (81) and 
(72) become 
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 (83) 
Both the investments and utilities in (83) differ from (70). 
 
9 Conclusion 
The article considers a system of independent components defended by a strategic defender and 
attacked by a strategic attacker. The reliability of each component depends on how strongly it is 
defended and attacked, and on the intensity of the contest. High intensity causes higher 
investment, but ceteris paribus depresses utilities. In a series system the attacker benefits from a 
substitution effect since attacker benefits flow from attacking any of the components. The 
attacker is highly sensitive to differences in attack efficiencies for the components. Conversely, 
the defender is less sensitive to differences in defense efficiencies for the components, since 
defender benefits flow from defending all components. With two components in series and 
intermediate intensity (with value one), the defender’s utility is positive when the product of the 
attack inefficiencies exceeds the product of the defense inefficiencies. Otherwise a corner 
solution emerges with zero utility to the defender and maximum utility to the attacker. The series 
system is then 100% insecure. However, even for a series system which usually benefits the 
attacker, when the attacker is sufficiently disadvantaged with high attack inefficiencies, and the 
intensity of the contest is sufficiently high, a corner solution emerges with maximum utility to 
the defender and zero utility to the attacker. The series system is then 100% secure. 
 
The results for the defender in a parallel system are equivalent to the results for the attacker in a 
series system, determined by permutation. Analogously, the results for the attacker in a parallel 
system are equivalent to the results for the defender in a series system. This means that whereas 
the attacker benefits from the substitution effect in series systems, the defender benefits from the 
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substitution effect in parallel systems. Hence whereas the attacker usually benefits in series 
systems, the defender usually benefits in parallel systems. 
 
With budget constraints the ratio of the investments for each component, and the contest success 
function for each component, are the same as without budget constraints when replacing the 
system values for the defender and attacker with their respective budget constraints. The results 
with budget constraints largely confirm the results without budget constraints. 
 
For a series system of parallel subsystems, inifinitely many components in parallel benefits the 
defender maximally regardless of the finite number of parallel subsystems in series. Conversely, 
infinitely many components in series benefits the attacker maximally regardless of the finite 
number of components in parallel in each subsystem. For a parallel system of series subsystems, 
the results are opposite. With equivalent components, equal unit costs for defender and attacker, 
equal intensity for all components, and equally many components in series and parallel, the 
defender always prefers the series system of parallel subsystems rather than the parallel system 
of series subsystems, and conversely for the attacker. 
 
Appendix 1 
Proof of Proposition 2b. Differentiating (9) when mi=mj=1 gives 
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 (A1) 
Differentiating (13), and considering the range of mi=m where u≥0, gives 
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Differentiating (14) gives 
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Proof of Proposition 4d. Differentiating (14) gives 
1
/ / / / /1 1 1 1 1
/ / / / /
nm m m m mu c r c r c r c r c rr m nLn Ln
n C R C R C R C R C R
− −          ∂           = + + − − + +                     ∂                      
 (A5) 
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When ( / ) /( / )c r C R  is low, the bracket after ( )( / ) /( / ) mm c r C R  in (A5) can be negative 
when n is low, causing /u n∂ ∂ <0. As ( / ) /( / )c r C R  increases, the bracket becomes positive. 
When Ci/R=ci/r, /u n∂ ∂ <0 as shown in (A2). As c/r increases above C/R, the bracket can 
become quite large, and even larger when the RHS replaces the LHS in the inequality 
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Proof of Proposition 4e. Differentiating (14) gives 
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This expression is evidently positive when ( / ) /( / )c r C R  is large. When ( / ) /( / )c r C R  is small, 
the bracket after ( )( / ) /( / ) mm c r C R  in (A8) is negative, and it is even more negative when the 
RHS replaces the LHS in the inequality 
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which follows from requiring U>0 in (14). Inserting the RHS in (A9) into (A8) gives 
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Proving that (A10) is positive amounts to proving that 
( ) ( ( ) 1/ ) 1/nf x x Ln x n n= − +  (A11) 
is positive when x>1, which is the case since f(1)=0 and 
1( ) ( ) 0 1nf x nx Ln x when x
x
−∂ = > >∂  (A12) 
which implies /U n∂ ∂ >0. 
 
Appendix 2 
Proof of Proposition 2Pb. Differentiating (36) when mi=mj=1 gives 
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 (A13) 
Differentiating (40), and considering the range of mi=m where U≥0, gives 
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Differentiating (41) gives 
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Fig. 1. Ratio form reliability ip  as a function of the investment it  for various mi when iT =1. 
 
Fig. 2. Difference form reliability ip  as a function of the investment it  for various ai, iT =1. 
 
Fig. 3. Series system: The six variables as functions of c1/r when c2/r=C1/R=C2/R=mi=1.   
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Fig. 4. Series system: The six variables as functions of c1/r when c2/r=C1/R=mi=1, C2/R=2. 
 
Fig. 5. Parallel system: Same parameters as in Fig. 3. 
 
Fig. 6. Parallel system: Same parameters as in Fig. 4. 
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Fig. 7 n parallel subsystems s times in series. 
 
Fig. 8 s series subsystems n times in parallel. 
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Abstract 
For systems built over time where defense investments are known, the defender moves first. 
When the defender gains attacker intelligence, or the attacker announces forthcoming attacks, 
the attacker moves first. When the defender moves first in a series system, and is sufficiently 
advantaged with a low unit cost of investment, the attacker is 100% deterred. Such deterrence is 
not possible in the simultaneous move game. With two equivalent components in series, the 
defender always prefers the two period game over the one period simultaneous move game. The 
attacker prefers the one period game, but prefers the two period game when the defense 
inefficiency is between 50% and 100% of the attack inefficiency. When the attacker moves first 
in a series system, for a broad set of parameter values, simulations illustrate that the attacker 
mostly prefers the first mover advantage, and prefers to attack two components rather than one 
component. When the attacker moves first in a parallel system, and is sufficiently advantaged 
with a low unit cost of investment, the defender is 100% deterred. Such deterrence is not 
possible in the simultaneous move game. With two equivalent components in parallel, the 
attacker always prefers the two period game over the one period simultaneous move game. The 
defender prefers the one period game, but prefers the two period game when the attack 
inefficiency is between 50% and 100% of the defense inefficiency. When the defender moves 
first in a parallel system, for a broad set of parameter values, simulations illustrate that the 
defender mostly prefers the first mover advantage, and prefers to defend two components rather 
than one component. 
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10 Introduction 
This is the second article in a sequence of two that analyzes strategic defense and attack for 
series and parallel reliability systems. The first article considered simultaneous moves by the 
defender and attacker. This second article considers sequential moves by the defender and 
attacker. 
 
That the defender and attacker choose their strategies simultaneously is often realistic, but not 
always. Sometimes one agent chooses its strategy first, which means that the other agent 
chooses its strategy thereafter, taking the first agent’s strategy as given. The optimization 
strategies are quite different. Sometimes there may be a first mover advantage, and sometimes a 
second mover advantage. 
 
For systems and infrastructures that are built over time, and where the defender is open and 
candid about its defense investment and installations, it is often realistic that the defender moves 
first. The attacker then takes the defender’s defense level as given when choosing the optimal 
attack. If the defender prefers to, or is able to, keep its defense investment secret, and when the 
attacker’s investment is also unknown, the two agents optimize in a simultaneous game. The 
opposite case means that the attacker announces its investment strategy up front, or the defender 
gets to know the attacker’s investment capacity or strategy through intelligence operations. In 
this case the attacker moves first, and the defender takes the attacker’s strategy as given when 
choosing the optimal defense. To determine which agent moves first, the essential issue is to 
determine what each agent knows about the opponent’s strategy when choosing its own strategy. 
 
As an example, the September 11, 2001 attack is probably best interpreted as a two period game 
where the defender moves first with an extremely weak defense. The defender had weak 
intelligence on the attacker’s strategy, and the intelligence that existed was not taken into 
account since the notion of flying planes into buildings lay outside the defender’s imagination. 
The attacker observed the weak defense, took it as given in its optimization, and launched an 
overwhelming unexpected attack. No replication of 9/11 has occurred at the time of writing this 
paper. Potential attackers reasonably expect the defense of most targets to be much improved, 
which causes an alternative solution to the attacker’s second period optimization problem. 
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In the cases where the defender moves first by preparations, no contest occurs before the 
attacker moves second. The attacker can often observe these preparations, but not always. 
Conversely, the defender frequently works to understand the attacker’s strategy. One example is 
President Bill Clinton’s attempts to observe Osama Bin Laden’s strategy in the late 1990s. 
Clearly, determining which decision is made first can be difficult. Was the bad defense decided 
first, with an overwhelming attack thereafter? Or was an overwhelming attack planned and 
decided first, with a bad defense decided thereafter? This may become a chicken and egg 
problem. Which comes first? But, we have the following difference between the two options: 1. 
Defender maximizes first, expecting a future decision by the attacker. Attacker maximizes 
second taking the defender's decision as given. 2. Attacker maximizes first, expecting a future 
decision by the defender. Defender maximizes second taking the attacker's decision as given.  
   
The key determinator is to assess who takes what as given when making a decision, and 
whether one decision is given in a more fundamental sense than the other decision. The 
defense sometimes goes first when it is designed without explicit knowledge about the nature 
and scope of the attack. The attacker thereafter reacts to that with a second decision. 
Conversely, a clear cut case when the attacker moves first is when the attacker announces up 
front that a new attack for example on some more or less specified target in the Western 
World will occur at some point in the future, and that the credibility is supported by 
demonstrated force investments for the attacker. This can happen even without an announced 
attack.  For example, the defender can gain intelligence that estimates force investments by the 
attacker, and then design a new defensive strategy thereafter. If the time between the intelligence 
and the attack is short, the defender is constrained in its ability to revise its strategy. It may for 
example merely be able to adjust alertness levels, and revise and slightly upgrade patrolling by 
guards and security personnel. However, with sufficient time between the intelligence and the 
attack, the defender can design an appropriate an entirely new strategy, and at best move second 
with full knowledge of the attacker’s strategy in the sense that it can be taken as given in the 
defender’s optimization problem. This may involve substantial capital investment into hardening 
targets and infrastructures, and training of security personnel with various kinds of competence. 
 
There are often grey zones with intermediate knowledge and uncertain estimates. However, the 
three cases simultaneous game, defender moves first, attacker moves first, are clear cut and 
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archetypical. For intermediate cases, solutions intermediate between the three archetypical 
can be assessed. 
 
Assessing whether the defense is superior to attack, or the attack is superior to defense, is 
essential. Clausewitz (1832) presented the classical argument for the "superiority of defense 
over attack," i.e. that "the defensive form of warfare is intrinsically stronger than the 
offensive": He writes (Clausewitz 1832:6.1.2): "The defender enjoys optimum lines of 
communication and retreat, and can choose the place for battle. By standing on the defensive 
and awaiting “the blow,” the defender does not expose himself, and can respond to the 
enemy’s attack according to its nature and character. The weaker commander thus often 
adopts the defensive because its inherent strength tends to offset his weakness. Hence the 
weak may, through delay, wear out the strong. The attacking army, on the other hand 
(Clausewitz 1832:6.3), "cuts itself off from its own theater of operations, ...suffers by having 
to leave its fortresses and depots behind," and wastes strength by moving forward. The 
attacker’s main advantages are due to the attack’s initial surprise, and the benefit of choosing 
the time, the nature, and the form of the attack. This, however, if one is weak, does not 
outweigh the benefits of the defense, unless one has a political initiative or expects to grow 
even weaker as time proceeds" (Clausewitz 1832:8.5).  
   
Hausken (2004:574) argues that the superiority of the defense over the attack appears to be 
even larger for production facilities and produced goods than for Clausewitz’s mobile army. 
The location of production facilities can be chosen for optimum defense. Although retreat is 
not especially easy for most production facilities, production is often deeply entrenched in an 
agent’s way of life, and its resources and goods can be camouflaged, hidden, and moved.  
   
Examples of features improving the defense are the use of trenches in World War I, castles 
and fortresses with canon fire from higher altitudes, and the use of checks and guards in 
broad senses of those terms. In WWI, the machine gun and trench warfare allowed for 
superiority of defense over attack. In WWII, tanks and better airplanes tilted some advantage 
over toward the attack.  
 
In the internet cyber era, the attacker has an advantage. Anderson (2001) argues as follows: 
"So information warfare looks rather like air warfare looked in the 1920s and 1930s. Attack 
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is simply easier than defense. Defending a modern information system could also be 
likened to defending a large, thinly-populated territory like the nineteenth century Wild West: 
the men in black hats can strike anywhere, while the men in white hats have to defend 
everywhere. Another possible relevant analogy is the use of piracy on the high seas as an 
instrument of state policy by many European powers in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. Until the great powers agreed to deny pirates safe haven, piracy was just too easy. 
The technical bias in favor of attack is made even worse by asymmetric information." Levitin 
(2007) argues more bluntly that “choosing the time, place, and means of attacks, the attacker 
has always an advantage over the defender.” Levitin’s argument (personal communication) 
applies especially with the presence of mobile offensive means (especially for cyber attack) 
and a huge number of possible targets (not limited now by military facilities), in contrast to 
conventional warfare where much resources should be moved to provide the offensive and 
where the only target is the defender’s position. 
 
Section 11 analyzes the two period series system where the defender chooses investment in the 
first period, while the attacker chooses investment in the second period. Section 12 considers the 
series system when the attacker moves first. Section 13 analyzes the two period parallel system 
where the attacker moves first, and the defender moves second. Section 14 considers the parallel 
system when the defender moves first. Section 15 concludes. 
 
11 Two period game for series system when defender moves first 
It is sometimes realistic that the defender chooses investment in the first period, while the 
attacker chooses investment in the second period. The second period is solved first. The n 
attacker FOCs for the second period are as in (7) and can for components i and j be expressed as 
1
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The two product signs are equal, so this is solved to yield 
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Inserting (85) into (7) gives 
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which for mi=1 is solved to yield 
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which implies 
( ) ( )i i i j j jC T t C T t+ = +  (88) 
for i,j=1,…,n, i≠ j, which is a consequence of the n attacker FOCs. Inserting (87) into the 
denominator in (5) and simplifying gives the defender’s first period utility 
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Two of the n defender FOCs, for components i and j, for the first period are 
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which are solved to yield 
/j i i jt c t c=  (91) 
Inserting (91) into (90) and solving for it , and inserting into (87), gives 
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which implies /( )i i it t T+ =( / ) /(( 1) / )i iC R n c r+ . Inserting into the utilities in (5) and (6) gives 
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When /ic r <( / ) /( 1)iC R n + , which is satisfied when the unit cost of defense is low when n is 
large, a corner solution exists where Ti=0, which deters the attacker successfully from 
component i. Assume without loss of generality that 1 /c r < 1( / ) /( 1)C R n +  for component 1, 
which causes T1=0. Assume that the defender invests an arbitrarily small but positive amount 
t1=0+ into defending component 1, causing component 1 to be 100% secure. Assuming that the k 
components 1,2,…,k are secure, replacing n with n-k in (92) and (93), and using subscript j 
instead of i, gives the investments and utilities for components j=k+1,…,n, 
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Proposition 9. Two period series system when defender moves first: (a) When the defense 
inefficiencies for the k components 1, 2,…,k are sufficiently low, 1 /c r < 1( / ) /( 1)C R n + , 
2 /c r < 2( / ) /C R n ,…, /kc r < ( / ) /( 2)kC R n k− + , then these components are not subject to 
attack and are 100% secure, Ti=0. When additionally /jc r < ( / ) /( 1)jC R n k− +  for any 
j=k+1,…,n, a (k+1)th corner solution exists where Tj=0, which deters the attacker successfully 
also from component j. (b) The series system is never 100% insecure except at the limit when 
n →∞ , or /ic r →∞  or / 0iC R =  for at least one component which causes u=0 and U=R. 
 
Proof. (a) Follows from (93) and from requiring Ti>0 in (92) and Tj>0 in (94). (b) Follows from 
(93). 
 
Whereas the one period series and parallel systems can be both 100% secure and 100% insecure 
for finite nonzero parameter values, the two period series system can be 100% secure, but not 
100% insecure, except for three extreme and unlikely cases. First, infinitely many components 
in series reduces the defense of each component towards zero, and reduces the defender’s utility 
towards zero, since (n+1)(n+1) in the denominators in (92) and (93) becomes overwhelmingly 
large. Second, if the defender has infinite unit cost of defending at least one component, that 
causes 100% insecurity for that component and thus for the series system. Third, if the attacker 
has zero unit cost of attacking at least one component, that causes 100% insecurity for that 
component and thus for the series system. This illustrates the defender’s first mover advantage. 
The defender prefers to precommit to its optimal investment level in the first period in a two 
period game, rather than moving simultaneously with the attacker in a one period game. 
 
Inserting n=2 into (92) and (93) gives 
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When 1 1( / ) /( / )c r C R <1/3 so that the attacker is deterred from component 1, (94) gives 
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When additionally 2 2( / ) /( / )c r C R <1/2, the attacker is deterred from both components causing 
t1=t2=T1=T2=U=0 and u=r. 
 
Fig. 9 illustrates as functions of the defense inefficiency c1/r for the same parameters as in Fig. 3, 
n=2, c2/r=C1/R=C2/R=mi=1. Although Figs. 9 and 3 show qualitatively similar trends for 
increases and decreases, the two most noteworthy differences are that in Fig. 9 the defender’s 
utility does not equal zero when c1/r>1, and the attacker does not attack component 1 when 
c1/r<1/3. 
 
Assessing whether the agents prefer the two period game or the one period game is analytically 
challenging except when n=2, ci=c, Ci=C, mi=1. We let subscript “t” denote two period game, 
and subscript “o” denote one period game. The interior solutions follow from inserting ci=c into 
(95), (14), (15), which gives 
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Three ranges for the ratio /
/
c r
C R
 apply. When 0< /
/
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C R
<1/3, the two period game has a corner 
solution where the attacker is deterred from both components, U=0 and u=r, and the one period 
game has an interior solution. When 1/3< /
/
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<1, both games have interior solutions. When 
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>1, the two period game has an interior solution and the one period game has a corner 
solution where the defender gives up, u=t1=t2=0, U=R. The ratio of the utilities are 
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 (99) 
Equation (99) is plotted in Fig. 10 as a function of /
/
c r
C R
. 
 
Proposition 10. Two period series system when defender moves first: Assume two equivalent 
components, ci=c, Ci=C, mi=1. The defender always prefers the two period game over the one 
period simultaneous move game and is indifferent between the two games when /
/
c r
C R
=1/2. The 
attacker prefers the two period game when 1/2< /
/
c r
C R
<1, and otherwise (when /
/
c r
C R
<1/2 and 
/
/
c r
C R
>1) prefers the one period game. 
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Proof. Follows from inspecting (99) and Fig. 10. 
 
The defender has a first mover’s advantage and always prefers the two period game over the one 
period game. The reason is that the defender can invest based on its expectation about the 
attacker’s strategic move in the second period. Since the attacker is deterred when 0< /
/
c r
C R
<1/3 
causing constant utilities U=0 and u=r for the two period game, that uo in (98) decreases in 
/
/
c r
C R
 causes ut/uo to increase in 
/
/
c r
C R
. When /
/
c r
C R
 increases above 1/3, the attacker is no 
longer deterred and an interior solution applies for both games. Both ut and uo decrease convexly 
in /
/
c r
C R
, but uo eventually reaches zero when 
/
/
c r
C R
=1. This causes ut/uo to be U shaped when 
1/3< /
/
c r
C R
<1, reaching infinity as /
/
c r
C R
 reaches one from below. The attacker’s two period 
utility gradually increases from zero when /
/
c r
C R
=1/3 as shown in (97), which causes Ut/Uo to 
increase. Interestingly, it increases above one when /
/
c r
C R
≥1/2. To understand that, (97) and 
(98) imply the investment ratios 
3
3
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 (100) 
The defender’s investment ratio decreases from a deterrence objective with large tit/tio when 
/
/
c r
C R
=1/3, to a low tit/tio when deterrence is not possible when 
/
/
c r
C R
=1. In contrast, the 
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attacker’s investment ratio is inverse U shaped with a maximum when /
/
c r
C R
=1/2. There is 
high predictability in the two period game. Both agents invest less and prefer the two period 
game when 1/2< /
/
c r
C R
<1. For the one period game both agents are more uncertain, especially 
when /
/
c r
C R
 is below one since the defender’s utility decreases and reaches zero when 
/
/
c r
C R
≥ 1. This means that the defender despite a first mover advantage is in a weak position 
when 1/2< /
/
c r
C R
<1, from which the attacker benefits. The reason Ut/Uo drops below one when 
/
/
c r
C R
 increases above one is that the attacker in the one period game earns maximum utility R 
when the defender earns zero in the one period game. 
 
There has been a discussion in the literature whether the defender should publicly announce 
defense investments. Infrastructures are built over time. Attackers sometimes take these as given 
when choosing components for attack. This suggests a two period game where the defender 
invests first. This section shows that the defender of a series system of equivalent components 
always prefers the two period game over the one period game. Even the attacker prefers the two 
period game when the defense inefficiency is between 50% and 100% of the attack inefficiency, 
but otherwise prefers the one period game. 
 
12 Two period game for series system when attacker moves first 
It is also possible, though often less common, that the attacker chooses investment in the first 
period, while the defender chooses investment in the second period. This sometimes happens in 
emergency response, or when the attacker has the possibility of announcing publicly and up 
front what the attack investment will be. The second period is solved first. The n defender FOCs 
for the second period are as in (7) and can for components i and j be expressed as 
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 (101) 
The two product signs are equal, so this is solved to yield 
( )m m mj j jm m i j i i ij j
j j m j
j i j
c T t t T
t T
c T t
++ =  (102) 
Inserting (102) into (7) gives 
11
1 1
1
( )
0
( )
m mn ni i
i i i i
im m mn n ni i i
ii i i i i i
m T c tu r c
t c t t T T
++
+ +
=
∂ = − =∂ + ∏  (103) 
which for mi=1 is solved to yield 
1/( 1)2
1
( ) / /
nn
i i i i i i
ii i
t t T c r t c r
T T
+
=
 + =   ∏  (104) 
which implies 
( ) ( )
ji
i i i i j j j j
TT
c t t T c t t T
=+ +  (105) 
for i,j=1,…,n, i≠ j. Hence a consequence of the n defender FOCs is that the contest success of 
the attacker divided by the defense expenditure of the defender is equal across all components. 
Equation (105) is of the second order in ti. Inserting the solution of ti into (101) for mi=1 gives 
an equation of fourth order in tj. Hence ti and tj are of the fourth order as functions of Ti and Tj. 
These expressions for ti and tj can be inserted into the attacker’s first period utility, which can be 
differentiated with respect to Ti and Tj to determine the attacker’s FOCs for the first period. The 
analytical solutions are too complex for straightforward interpretation. Furthermore, corner 
solutions with zero investment for the attacker have to scrutinized differently for the following 
reason. When the defender moves first, the defender has to defend each of the n components in 
series since any component not defended is attacked with arbitrarily small investment by the 
attacker causing utility zero to the defender and utility R to the attacker. In contrast, when the 
attacker moves first, it may attack one component, a subset of components, or all components. 
 
In order to gain insight despite these analytical challenges into the case when the attacker moves 
first, let us consider the special case of equivalent components, ci=c, Ci=C, mi=1. If the attacker 
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attacks more than one component, these are attacked equally much since the attacker has no 
reason to distinguish between them. The attacker has three options. First, to attack any one 
component, and not the others. Second, to attack a subset k of components equally much, 
k=2,…,n-1. Third, to attack all n components equally much. Starting with the first option, 
assume that the attacker attacks component i with Ti and component j with Tj=0, j=1,…,i-
1,i+1,…,n. Solving the second period for the defender first, the solution of (7) for mi=1 (general 
mi gives no analytical solution) gives 
2 0 /( )
i i
i i i
i ii i
T Tu r c t T
t c rt T
∂ = − = ⇒ = −∂ +  (106) 
Inserting into (6) for n=1 gives the attacker’s first period utility 
/i i i iU R T c r C T= −  (107) 
Differentiating with respect to the attacker’s free choice variable Ti for the first period gives 
2
/ /
0
2 4( / )
i i
i i
i i i
c r c rU R C T
T T C R
∂ = − = ⇒ =∂  (108) 
Inserting into (106), (5), (6) gives 
2
2 2
2 / / (2 / / ) /
, ,
4 /4( / ) 4( / )
i i i i i
i
ii i
C R c r C R c r c r
t u U
C RC R C R
− −= = =  (109) 
When the ratio of the defender’s unit cost to system value is more than twice as large as that of 
the attacker, ci/r>2Ci/R, the defender refrains from investing, component i is 100% insecure, and 
the defender earns zero utility u=0, while the attacker earns U=R. This gives a first mover 
advantage to the attacker. 
 
Proceeding with option 2, inserting ti=t, Ti=T, and mi=1 into (7), and replacing n with k gives 
1
1( )
k
k
Ttr c
t T
−
+ =+  (110) 
For k=2 this equation also follows from, in accordance with (5), assuming defender utility 
2
3 3
22 , 2 0 /
( ) ( )
t u tT tTu r ct r c c r
t T t t T t T
∂ = − = − = ⇒ = + ∂ + +   (111) 
This is a third order equation in t with three solutions. Testing reveals that the following solution 
applies for our purpose 
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 (112) 
Using (6), for k=2 the attacker’s utility is 
2
1 2tU R CT
t T
  = − −   +  
 (113) 
Inserting (112) into (113) gives the attacker’s first period utility as a function of the variable T 
and parameters c,r,C,R, 
 (114) 
Differentiating gives the attacker’s FOC 
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 (115) 
which determines T numerically for specific values of c,r,C,R. Inserting T into (111), (112), 
(114) gives numerical values for u, t, U. Fig. 11 plots t,u/r,T as a function of c/r when C/R=1 
when the attacker attacks k=1 component (subscript I) and k=2 components (subscript II). The 
attacker attacks each component slightly more when attacking two components rather than one 
component, TII>TI when ci<0.6. This has a detrimental impact on the defender. Whereas tI for 
one component decreases linearly reaching zero when c/r=2, as determined by (109), tII for two 
components decreases more sharply and drops to zero when c/r=0.6 which causes zero utility 
u/r=0. The attacker’s utilities are shown in Fig. 12. For one component UI/R increases linearly to 
0.5 when c/r=2, and jumps to one as determined by (109). For two components UII/R increases 
to 0.32 when c/r=0.6, and jumps to one. The last two curves show the two period game with two 
components when the defender moves first, and the one period game with two components. 
Aside from the small range 0.5<c/r<0.6 when the attacker prefers the defender to move first, the 
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attacker prefers the first mover advantage, and prefers to attack two components rather than 
one component. Attacking two components forces the defender to defend both, which is an 
overwhelming task as the defender’s unit cost of investment increases. 
 
13 Two period game for parallel system when attacker moves first 
The two period parallel system where the attacker invests in the first period, while the defender 
invests in the second period, corresponds to the two period series system where the defender 
invests in the first period, while the attacker invests in the second period. The solution is found 
by permuting capital and regular letters. The n defender FOCs for the second period are as in 
(35) and can for components i and j be expressed as 
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 (116) 
The two product signs are equal, so this is solved to yield 
1
1
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Inserting (117) into (35) gives 
1 1
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which for mi=1 is solved to yield 
1/( 1)
1
1 /
/
nn
i i i i
ii
t T c r T
c r
+
=
 = −  ∏  (119) 
which implies 
( ) ( )i i i j j jc T t c T t+ = +  (120) 
for i,j=1,…,n, i≠ j, which is a consequence of the n defender FOCs. Inserting (119) into the 
denominator in (34) and simplifying gives the attacker’s first period utility 
1/( 1)
11
/
nn n
i i i i
ii
U R T c r C T
+
==
 = −   ∑∏  (121) 
Two of the n attacker FOCs, for components i and j, for the first period are 
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which are solved to yield 
/j i i jT C T C=  (123) 
Inserting (123) into (122) and solving for iT , and inserting into (119), gives 
( 1) ( 1)
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which implies /( )i i iT t T+ =( / ) /(( 1) / )i ic r n C R+ . Inserting into the utilities in (33) and (34) 
gives 
1
1 1 1
( 1) / / / /1 11 1 ,
( 1) / / /( 1) ( 1)
n nn
i i i i
n n
i i ii i i
n C R c r c r c rRu r U
n C R C R C Rn n += = =
  + −= − + =   ++ +  ∑ ∏ ∏ (125) 
When /iC R < ( / ) /( 1)ic r n + , which is satisfied when the unit cost of attack is low when n is 
large, a corner solution exists where ti=0, which deters the defender successfully from defending 
component i. Assume without loss of generality that 1 /C R < 1( / ) /( 1)c r n +  for component 1, 
which causes t1=0. Assume that the attacker invests an arbitrarily small but positive amount 
T1=0+ into attacking component 1, causing component 1 to be 100% insecure. Assuming that the 
k components 1,2,…,k are insecure, replacing n with n-k in (124) and (125), and using subscript 
j instead of i, gives the investments and utilities for components j=k+1,…,n, 
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 (126) 
 
Proposition 9P. Two period parallel system when attacker moves first: (a) When the attack 
inefficiencies for the k components 1, 2,…,k are sufficiently low, 1 /C R < 1( / ) /( 1)c r n + , 
2 /C R < 2( / ) /c r n ,…, /kC R < ( / ) /( 2)kc r n k− + , then these components are not defended and 
are 100% insecure, ti=0. When additionally /jC R < ( / ) /( 1)jc r n k− +  for any j=k+1,…,n, a 
(k+1)th corner solution exists where tj=0, which causes the defender not to defend component j. 
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(b) The parallel system is never 100% secure except at the limit when n →∞ , or /iC R →∞  
or / 0ic r =  for at least one component which causes u=r and U=0. 
 
Proof. (a) Follows from (125) and from requiring Ti>0 in (124) and Tj>0 in (126). (b) Follows 
from (125). 
 
Whereas the one period series and parallel systems can be both 100% secure and 100% insecure 
for finite nonzero parameter values, the two period parallel system can be 100% insecure, but 
not 100% secure, except for three extreme and unlikely cases. First, infinitely many components 
in parallel reduces the attack on each component towards zero, and reduces the attacker’s utility 
towards zero, since (n+1)(n+1) in the denominators in (124) and (125) becomes overwhelmingly 
large. Second, if the attacker has infinite unit cost of attacking at least one component, that 
causes 100% security for that component and thus for the parallel system. Third, if the defender 
has zero unit cost of defending at least one component, that causes 100% security for that 
component and thus for the parallel system. This illustrates the attacker’s first mover advantage. 
The attacker prefers to precommit to its optimal investment level in the first period in a two 
period game, rather than moving simultaneously with the defender in one period game. 
 
Inserting n=2 into (124) and (125) gives 
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 (127) 
When 1 1( / ) /( / )C R c r <1/3 so that the defender is deterred from defending component 1, (126) 
gives 
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 22 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 / / / (2 / / ) /
0, , , ,
4( / ) 4( / ) 4( / ) 4( / )
C R c r c r C R c r c rT t t T u U
C R C R C R C R
− −= = = = = = (128) 
When additionally 2 2( / ) /( / )C R c r <1/2, the defender is deterred from defending both 
components causing T1=T2=t1=t2=u=0 and U=R. 
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Fig. 13 illustrates as functions of the defense inefficiency c1/r for the same parameters as in Fig. 
5, n=2, c2/r=C1/R=C2/R=mi=1. The two most noteworthy differences between Figs. 10 and 5 are 
that in Fig. 13 the attacker’s utility does not equal zero when c1/r<1, and the defender does not 
defend component 1 when c1/r>3C1/R. 
 
Assessing whether the agents prefer the n period game or the one period game is analytically 
challenging except when n=2, ci=c, Ci=C, mi=1. We let subscript “t” denote two period game, 
and subscript “o” denote one period game. The interior solutions follow from inserting ci=c into 
(127), (41), (42), which gives 
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 (130) 
Three ranges for the ratio /
/
C R
c r
 apply. When 0< /
/
C R
c r
<1/3, the two period game has a corner 
solution where the defender is deterred from defending both components, u=0 and U=R, and the 
one period game has an interior solution. When 1/3< /
/
C R
c r
<1, both games have interior 
solutions. When /
/
C R
c r
>1, the two period game has an interior solution and the one period game 
has a corner solution where the attacker is deterred, U=T1=T2=0, u=r. The ratio of the utilities 
are 
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 (131) 
Equation (131) is plotted in Fig. 14 as a function of /
/
c r
C R
. (Plotting as a function of /
/
C R
c r
 gives 
the same curves as in Fig. 10, permuting capital and regular letters for the defender and 
attacker.) 
 
Proposition 10P. Two period parallel system when attacker moves first: Assume two equivalent 
components, ci=c, Ci=C, mi=1. The attacker always prefers the two period game over the one 
period simultaneous move game and is indifferent between the two games when /
/
C R
c r
=1/2. The 
defender prefers the two period game when 1/2< /
/
C R
c r
<1, and otherwise (when /
/
C R
c r
<1/2 and 
/
/
C R
c r
>1) prefers the one period game. 
 
Proof. Follows from inspecting (131) and Fig. 14. 
 
The attacker has a first mover’s advantage and always prefers the two period game over the one 
period game. The reason is that the attacker can invest based on its expectation about the 
defender’s strategic move in the second period. Since the defender is deterred from defending 
when 0< /
/
C R
c r
<1/3 causing constant utilities u=0 and U=R for the two period game, that Uo in 
(130) decreases in /
/
C R
c r
 causes Ut/Uo to increase in 
/
/
C R
c r
. When /
/
C R
c r
 increases above 1/3, 
the defender is no longer deterred from defending and an interior solution applies for both 
games. Both Ut and Uo decrease convexly in 
/
/
C R
c r
, but Uo eventually reaches zero when 
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/
/
C R
c r
=1. This causes Ut/Uo to be U shaped when 1/3<
/
/
C R
c r
<1, reaching infinity as /
/
C R
c r
 
reaches one from below, which means that /
/
c r
C R
 reaches one from above in Fig. 14. The 
defender’s two period utility gradually increases from zero when /
/
C R
c r
=1/3 as shown in (129), 
which causes ut/uo to increase in 
/
/
C R
c r
. Interestingly, it increases above one when /
/
C R
c r
≥1/2. 
To understand that, (129) and (130) imply the investment ratios 
3
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C Rc r when
c r
C Rwhen
C R C R c r
t C Rc r c r when
t c rC R
C Rc r when
c r
 =  +  = = =        =
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 (132) 
The attacker’s investment ratio decreases from a deterrence objective with large Tit/Tio when 
/
/
C R
c r
=1/3, to a low Tit/Tio when deterrence is not possible when 
/
/
C R
c r
=1. In contrast, the 
defender’s investment ratio is inverse U shaped with a maximum when /
/
C R
c r
=1/2. There is 
high predictability in the two period game. Both agents invest less and prefer the two period 
game when 1/2< /
/
C R
c r
<1.  
 
For the one period game both agents are more uncertain, especially when /
/
C R
c r
 is below one 
since the attacker’s utility decreases and reaches zero when /
/
C R
c r
≥ 1. This means that the 
attacker despite a first mover advantage is in a weak position when 1/2< /
/
C R
c r
<1, from which 
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the defender benefits. The reason ut/uo drops below one when 
/
/
C R
c r
 increases above one, 
which means that /
/
c r
C R
 decreases below one in Fig. 14, is that the defender in the one period 
game earns maximum utility r when the attacker earns zero in the one period game. 
 
An interesting question is whether the attacker should publicly announce attack investments. 
This section shows that the attacker of a parallel system of equivalent components always 
prefers the two period game over the one period game. Even the defender prefers the two period 
game when the attack inefficiency is between 50% and 100% of the defense inefficiency, but 
otherwise prefers the one period game. 
 
14 Two period game for parallel system when defender moves first 
When the defender moves first in a parallel system, the n attacker FOCs for the second period 
are as in (35) and can for components i and j be expressed as 
1
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 (133) 
The two product signs are equal, so this is solved to yield 
( )m m mj j jm m i j i i ij j
j j m j
j i j
C t T t T
t T
C t T
++ =  (134) 
Inserting (134) into (35) gives 
11
1 1
1
( )
0
( )
m mn ni i
i i i i
im m mn n ni i i
ii i i i i i
m t C TU R C
T C T t T t
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which for mi=1 is solved to yield 
1/( 1)2
1
( ) / /
nn
i i i i i i
ii i
T t T C R T C R
t t
+
=
 + =   ∏  (136) 
which implies 
( ) ( )
ji
i i i i j j j j
tt
C T t T C T t T
=+ +  (137) 
 75
for i,j=1,…,n, i≠ j. Hence a consequence of the n attacker FOCs is that the contest success of 
the defender divided by the attack expenditure of the attacker is equal across all components. 
Equation (137) is of the second order in Ti. Inserting the solution of Ti into (133) for mi=1 gives 
an equation of fourth order in Tj. Hence Ti and Tj are of the fourth order as functions of ti and tj. 
These expressions for Ti and Tj can be inserted into the defender’s first period utility, which can 
be differentiated with respect to ti and tj to determine the defender’s FOCs for the first period. 
The analytical solutions are too complex for straightforward interpretation. Furthermore, corner 
solutions with zero investment for the defender have to scrutinized differently for the following 
reason. When the attacker moves first, the attacker has to attack each of the n components in 
parallel since any component not attacked is defended with arbitrarily small investment by the 
defender causing utility zero to the attacker and utility r to the defender. In contrast, when the 
defender moves first, it may defend one component, a subset of components, or all components. 
 
In order to gain insight despite these analytical challenges into the case when the defender 
moves first, let us consider the special case of equivalent components, ci=c, Ci=C, mi=1. If the 
defender defends more than one component, these are defended equally much since the defender 
has no reason to distinguish between them. The defender has three options. First, to defend any 
one component, and not the others. Second, to defend a subset k of components equally much, 
k=2,…,n-1. Third, to defend all n components equally much. Starting with the first option, 
assume that the defender defends component i with ti and component j with tj=0, j=1,…,i-
1,i+1,…,n. Solving the second period for the attacker first, the solution of (35) for mi=1 (general 
mi gives no analytical solution) gives 
2 0 /( )
i i
i i i
i ii i
t tU R C T t
T C Rt T
∂ = − = ⇒ = −∂ +  (138) 
Inserting into (33) gives the defender’s first period utility 
/i i i iu r t C R c t= −  (139) 
Differentiating with respect to the defender’s free choice variable ti for the first period gives 
2
/ /
0
2 4( / )
i i
i i
i i i
C R C Ru r c t
t t c r
∂ = − = ⇒ =∂  (140) 
Inserting into (138), (33), (34) gives 
2
2 2
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, ,
4 /4( / ) 4( / )
i i i i i
i
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c r C R C R c r C R
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When the attacker’s unit cost is more than twice as large as the defender’s unit cost, 
Ci/R>2ci/r the attacker refrains from investing, component i is 100% secure, and the attacker 
earns zero utility U=0, while the defender earns u=r. This gives a first mover advantage to the 
defender. 
 
Proceeding with option 2, inserting ti=t, Ti=t, and mi=1 into (35), and replacing n with k gives 
1
1( )
k
k
tTR C
t T
−
+ =+  (142) 
For k=2 this equation also follows from, in accordance with (34), assuming attacker utility 
2
3 3
22 , 2 0 /
( ) ( )
T U tT tTU R CT R C C R
t T T t T t T
∂ = − = − = ⇒ = + ∂ + +   (143) 
This is a third order equation in T with three solutions. Testing reveals that the following 
solution applies for our purpose 
 
 (144) 
Using (34), for k=2 the defender’s utility is 
2
1 2Tu r ct
t T
  = − −   +  
 (145) 
Inserting (144) into (145) gives the defender’s first period utility as a function of the variable t 
and parameters c,r,C,R, 
 (146) 
Differentiating gives the defender’s FOC 
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 (147) 
which determines t numerically for specific values of c,r,C,R. Inserting t into (143), (144), (146) 
gives numerical values for U, T, u.  
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Fig. 15 plots t,T,U/R as a function of c/r when C/R=1 when the attacker attacks k=1 
component (subscript I) and k=2 components (subscript II). (Plotting as a function of C/R when 
c/r=1 gives the same curves as in Fig. 11, permuting capital and regular letters for the defender 
and attacker.) The defender defends each component slightly more when defending two 
components rather than one component, tII>tI when c/r>1.8. This has a detrimental impact on the 
attacker. The attacker’s investment is higher for one than for two components, TI>TII, and the 
utility is significantly higher, UI/R>UII/R. For one component the attacker ceases investment 
when c/r<0.5, as determined by Ti<0 in (141), while for two components the attacker ceases 
investment when c/r<1.8. Despite significantly higher unit cost, 1.8>C/R=1, the defender 
defending two components deters the attacker. The defender’s utilities are shown in Fig. 16. For 
one component uI/r equals one when c/r<0.5, and thereafter decreases convexly as determined 
by (141). For two components the defender enjoys utility r when c/r<1.8, and the utility 
thereafter decreases, uI/r>uII/r. The last two curves show the two period game with two 
components when the attacker moves first, and the one period game with two components. 
Aside from the small range 1.8<c/r<2 when the defender prefers the attacker to move first, the 
defender prefers the first mover advantage, and prefers to defend two components rather than 
one component. Defending two components forces the attacker to attack both, which is an 
overwhelming task as the defender’s unit cost of investment decreases. 
 
15 Conclusion 
Contesting agents preferring high versus low reliability for a system are often in the time 
asymmetric situation where one agent (the defender or attacker) chooses its optimal strategy 
first, expecting a future decision by the other agent. The other agent chooses its optimal strategy 
thereafter taking the first agent’s strategy as given. For systems and infrastructures that are built 
over time, where the defender is open and candid about its defense investment and installations, 
and lacks knowledge about potential attackers, the defender moves first. Conversely, an attacker 
may announce up front the specifics of a forthcoming attack, or the defender can gain 
intelligence that estimates force investments by the attacker. In this case the attacker moves first.  
 
When the defender moves first in a series system, and the defense inefficiency divided by the 
system value is less than the attack inefficiency divided by the system value and divided by the 
number of components plus one, which is a strict requirement, then these components are not 
subject to attack and are 100% secure. A less strict requirement applies for the remaining 
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components, and the attacker is deterred. Such 100% deterrence of the attacker is not possible 
in a simultaneous move game. The defender thus has a first mover advantage, but this requires 
substantially less unit costs of defense than unit costs of attack given the ceteris paribus 
advantage of the attacker in series systems. The series system is 100% insecure at the limit with 
infinitely many components, or when the unit cost of defense for any component divided by the 
system value approaches infinity, or when the unit cost of attack for any component divided by 
the system value approaches zero. 
 
With two equivalent components in series, the defender always prefers the two period game 
over the one period simultaneous move game. The reason is that the defender can invest based 
on its expectation about the attacker’s strategic move in the second period. In the two period 
game there is higher predictability, and both agents invest less. The attacker prefers the one 
period game, but prefers the two period game when the defense inefficiency is between 50% and 
100% of the attack inefficiency. Over this range the defender is maximally vulnerable. Recall 
that in the one period game the defender withdraws from investment when the defense 
inefficiency exceeds the attack inefficiency. 
 
When the defender moves first in a series system, the defender has to defend each component 
since any component not defended is attacked with arbitrarily small investment causing a 100% 
insecure system. This situation is analytically tractable. In contrast, when the attacker moves 
first in a series system, it may attack one component, a subset of components, or all components. 
This situation is quite complex to react to for the defender. In general, fourth order equations 
follow which are illustrated with simulations. With the special assumption that the attacker 
attacks only one component, this component is 100% insecure when the ratio of the defender’s 
unit cost to system value is more than twice as large as that of the attacker. This means that the 
defender is twice as disadvantaged as the attacker. The consequence is that the defender refrains 
from investing, earns zero utility, while the attacker earns maximum utility and enjoys a first 
mover advantage. For a broad set of parameter values, the simulations illustrate that the attacker 
mostly prefers the first mover advantage, and prefers to attack two components rather than one 
component. Attacking two components forces the defender to defend both, which is an 
overwhelming task as the defender’s unit cost of investment increases. 
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When the attacker moves first in a parallel system, and the attack inefficiency divided by the 
system value is less than the defense inefficiency divided by the system value and divided by the 
number of components plus one, which is a strict requirement, then these components are not 
defended and are 100% insecure. A less strict requirement applies for the remaining 
components, and these are then not defended. Such 100% insecurity for the defender is not 
possible in a simultaneous move game. The attacker thus has a first mover advantage, but this 
requires substantially less unit costs of attack than unit costs of defense given the ceteris paribus 
advantage of the defender in parallel systems. The parallel system is 100% secure at the limit 
with infinitely many components, or when the unit cost of attack for any component divided by 
the system value approaches infinity, or when the unit cost of defense for any component 
divided by the system value approaches zero. 
 
With two equivalent components in parallel, the attacker always prefers the two period game 
over the one period simultaneous move game. The reason is that the attacker can invest based on 
its expectation about the defender’s strategic move in the second period. In the two period game 
there is higher predictability, and both agents invest less. The defender prefers the one period 
game, but prefers the two period game when the attack inefficiency is between 50% and 100% 
of the defense inefficiency. Over this range the attacker is maximally vulnerable. Recall that in 
the one period game the attacker withdraws from investment when the attack inefficiency 
exceeds the defense inefficiency. 
 
When the attacker moves first in a parallel system, the attacker has to attack each component 
since any component not attacked is defended with arbitrarily small investment causing a 100% 
secure system. This situation is analytically tractable. In contrast, when the defender moves first 
in a parallel system, it may defend one component, a subset of components, or all components. 
This situation is quite complex to react to for the attacker. In general, fourth order equations 
follow which are illustrated with simulations. With the special assumption that the defender 
defends only one component, this component is 100% secure when the ratio of the attacker’s 
unit cost to system value is more than twice as large as that of the defender. This means that the 
attacker is twice as disadvantaged as the defender. The consequence is that the attacker refrains 
from investing, earns zero utility, while the defender earns maximum utility and enjoys a first 
mover advantage. For a broad set of parameter values, the simulations illustrate that the defender 
mostly prefers the first mover advantage, and prefers to defend two components rather than one 
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component. Defending two components forces the attacker to attack both, which is an 
overwhelming task as the attacker’s unit cost of investment increases. 
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Fig. 9. Series system, defender moves first. The six variables as functions of c1/r when 
c2/r=C1/R=C2/R=mi=1. 
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Fig. 10. Series system, defender moves first: Ratio of utilities for two period game versus one 
period game. 
 
Fig. 11. Series system: Attacker moves first and attacks one component (subscript I) or two 
components (subscript II), C/R=1. 
 
Fig. 12. Series system. Attacker moves first and attacks one component (subscript I) or two 
components (subscript II), C/R=1. 
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Fig. 13. Parallel system, attacker moves first. Same parameters as in Fig. 9. 
 
 
Fig. 14. Parallel system, attacker moves first: Ratio of utilities for two period game versus one 
period game. 
 
Fig. 15. Parallel system. Defender moves first and defends one component (subscript I) or two 
components (subscript II), C/R=1. 
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Fig. 16. Parallel system. Defender moves first and defends one component (subscript I) or two 
components (subscript II), C/R=1. 
